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Justice as Harmony:  
The Distinct Resonance of Chief 





The recent retirement of the internationally esteemed and nationally 
treasured Chief Justice of Canada, Beverley McLachlin, has provided an 
occasion to reflect on the remarkable achievements of her long and 
brilliant career. A tremendous outpouring of tributes, both in public and in 
private, accompanied the initial announcement, with encores on the date of 
her retirement and upon her final departure from the Court following the 
release of judgments under reserve. The substance of these tributes is so 
diverse, and the sources so traverse the expanse of the legal community 
and of society at large that they remind us of our great fortune in having 
her as the leader of our justice system for so long. Of her career as Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is commonly noted that she was 
the first female to ascend to that post, and the longest-serving of any holder 
of it.1 But beyond facts and figures such as these, her many qualities that 
have been praised, professional and personal, are the true measure of her 
distinction. They make clear that this outpouring of praise is not homage to 
high office, but gratitude for the particular way in which she discharged the 
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School of Law, University of British Columbia. Marcus is a former law clerk to Chief Justice 
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1  Supreme Court of Canada, News Release (June 12, 2017) online: SCC: <https://scc-csc. 
lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/5552/index.do>. 
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duties of that office and delivered on its opportunities. It is, quite simply, 
admiration of Beverley McLachlin. 
Granted the special privilege of serving as her law clerk, I benefited 
from the experience of witnessing these qualities at work. It was 
instructive to be able to perceive their value to the court-side of the 
adjudication process, to management of the institutional and interpersonal 
environments of a collegiate court, and to charting how to navigate her 
concomitant roles of public face of the judiciary and high-ranking civic 
leader. From an internal perspective, it was very evident how and why the 
qualities she cultivated were so vital to the success she achieved in the 
various aspects of the office of chief justice. Equally apparent was how 
much could go wrong in all these spheres, absent those qualities. 
Praise of Chief Justice McLachlin often focuses, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
on virtues widely recognized: Integrity, dedication, honed intellect and 
reason, compassion, modesty, fairness, respect for tradition, common 
sense, and judgment are hardly novel, although not so easy to consistently 
adhere to, and not so commonly coinciding in a single person. In trying to 
understand what enabled her extraordinary achievements, much may be 
said of her nurture of these and other well-known attributes of excellence 
in judging, management, and leadership.  
But are there other aspects of the conduct of her work that are less 
commonly perceived, at least in this context, and that may have contributed 
to the widespread and overwhelming admiration her career has earned? If 
so, arguably these aspects are harder to identify, articulate, and explain. 
And yet, because they are less appreciated, they may be among the 
qualities of greatest potential value to illuminate for the benefit of future 
jurists and professional leaders, as well as the citizens they serve. 
Intricate Principle 
One feature that has often been said to define the McLachlin Court is 
its decisions’ degree of consensus among the judges within it as well as 
spectrum of support among the public outside it. Emmett Macfarlane 
notes, for instance, the frequency of its unanimity, in “sharp contrast” to 
some other courts, and a puzzle which “the predominant political science 
models of judicial behaviour are at pains to explain”.2 Not uncommon, it 
seems, are courts that have suffered and perhaps perpetuated greater 
                                                                                                                       
2  Emmett Macfarlane, Governing from the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canada and the 
Judicial Role (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), at 122-23 [hereinafter “Macfarlane”]. 
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fractiousness, whether rooted in ideology, rivalry, personality conflicts, 
or simply pressures of the job. Close at hand, Macfarlane cites the 
sharply divided Supreme Court of the United States as an example.3 
Closest of all, Kirk Makin reports that the Supreme Court of Canada, 
prior to Beverley McLachlin’s move to the centre chair, itself “had 
become increasingly factionalized, overworked and demoralized”.4  
Yet, the McLachlin Court’s distinct pattern of decisions boasting 
broad internal and external support was typically not a project of political 
pragmatism — Bismarck’s realpolitik — although Beverley McLachlin 
certainly exhibited the exceptional practical sense essential in any 
masterful judge. The jurisprudence that emerged from the McLachlin 
Court, and the processes and practices that produced it, were profoundly 
principled. While not identifiable with any singular school of thought, 
her own opinions are replete with principle. In different cases, her 
judgments might promulgate normative ideals, prefer ‘incremental’ 
evolution, or address values’ wider implications only in obiter. But in all 
cases, her judgments reveal themselves keenly alive to the principles 
involved, devoted to understanding each’s relevance to a suitable 
resolution, and prudently thoughtful about the implications for foreseeable 
future cases. This is not to suggest these opinions are somehow devoid of 
error or sans shortcomings — there can be, as Justice Robert Jackson 
counselled, no doctrine of judicial infallibility;5 and it is a truism to say 
that an opinion is only as good as the record on which it is based. But the 
judgments of Chief Justice McLachlin are always to be found earnestly 
and incisively probing the various values at issue. From this especially 
deep engagement with principle, not from pragmatism, springs the 
complex pattern that characterizes the McLachlin Court’s jurisprudence 
and defies ideological identification.6 
A Question of Balance? 
Beyond it representing a complex pattern, how can we better understand 
the broadly supported and deeply principled jurisprudence of Chief Justice 
                                                                                                                       
3  Id., at 123. 
4  Kirk Makin, “Shedding some light on the decline of a lion in winter”, The Globe and 
Mail (May 6, 2011) online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/shedding-some-light-
on-the-decline-of-a-lion-in-winter/article578974/>. 
5  Brown v. Allen, 344 US 443 (1953). 
6  Cynthia Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court 
of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), at 207-209 [hereinafter “Ostberg”]. 
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McLachlin, in order to draw guidance from it that may be valuable to future 
jurists and professional leaders serving the public interest? 
One metaphor that had sometimes been used to describe her 
characteristic work was that of balance. Peter McCormick, for instance, 
wrote: 
The central notion … [f]or the McLachlin Court, it is balancing ... 
Balancing of elements within rights, balancing within ideas like 
fundamental justice, and balancing between rights: “balance” is a 
powerful metaphor. Still it involves the Supreme Court in much more 
complex exercises than finding clear-cut rights violations resulting in 
invalidity, or in “bright-line” standards that unambiguously signal what 
the court will be doing in similar or related cases.7 
“Balance” was a word Chief Justice McLachlin often used, not only 
in judgments but in official speeches.8 And although described by 
McCormick as bearing special distinction within the McLachlin Court, 
balance is a long-familiar legal notion. Indeed, dating to antiquity, the 
personification of justice — today marking the entrance to the Supreme 
Court of Canada and courthouses the world over — is the goddess 
Justitia, whose iconography involves scales of balance.9 
Before joining the Chambers of the Chief Justice, the time-honoured idea 
of balance coloured my impression of her vision of justice. It was a quality  
I was perhaps disposed to perceive, having relied on it in other contexts.10  
To my surprise, however, I wound up finding this impression to be wrong.  
Plurality and Unity 
Based on my experience in the Chambers, I concluded that the aim 
that she was pursuing, although in important ways overlapping with 
balance, was more sophisticated and difficult than ably balancing 
relevant interests. It also appeared that this higher aim was a constant; 
and not just a routine feature, but fundamental to her approach. The 
Chief Justice, colleagues and aides, and others who closely followed her  
                                                                                                                       
7  Peter McCormick, The End of the Charter Revolution: Looking Back from the New 
Normal (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), at 166 [hereinafter “McCormick”]. 
8  See SCLR Vol. 87, Table A. 
9  The rendering outside the Supreme Court of Canada is rare in omitting the feature of her 
visibly holding aloft the scales of balance. 
10  In my book on athletic aspiration, I described it as part of an essential foundation for 
sustainable striving: “Chapter 6: Good Health & Balance” in Making It in Hockey: What You Should 
Know, from the Experts and Pros (Toronto: H.B. Fenn & Co., 2009), at 69-76. 
(2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d) JUSTICE AS HARMONY 7 
work, all seemed to have a palpable sense of this quality and of the 
guidance it gave. Yet, there was no term for it consistently used and able 
to convincingly capture it.  
Beyond balance, Chief Justice McLachlin had employed various 
concepts in different contexts to describe either the challenge, or the 
aim, or the exercise called for. For instance, in seeking to highlight the 
dynamic aspect, she stated that “a more appropriate metaphor may be 
that of equilibrium”.11 Elsewhere, instead of balancing multiple 
interests, she foresaw blending them as a “mélange”12 or an 
“amalgam”.13 In another discourse, she described the “clash of forces” 
among the issues in dispute as a “dialectic [that] must reach 
synthesis”.14 Frequently, her remarks also invoked a holistic concern, 
hence describing the judicial aim as being “decisions that best represent 
the interests of the community as a whole”.15 Combining the notions 
evoking diverse strands with those evincing concern with integration, 
another metaphor Chief Justice McLachlin favoured was a “tightly 
woven fabric”.16 Like balance, these various other concepts overlapped 
in some way with the quality I described as intuitively understood and 
emulated by those in her orbit. They were not unrelated. There had to 
be a “general organizing principle … which underpins and informs the 
various” aspects invoked by these several metaphors, “in various 
situations and types of relationships”.17 However, a comprehensive 
conceptualization of it, which could be used to transmit it to others 
outside the sphere of her significant influence, still seemed elusive.  
                                                                                                                       
11  Beverley McLachlin, A Canadian judgment: the lectures of Chief Justice Beverley 
McLachlin in New Zealand, April 2003 (Christchurch: Centre for Commercial & Corporate Law, 
2004), at 35 [hereinafter “NZ”]. 
12  Beverley McLachlin, “Defining Moments: The Canadian Constitution”, Remarks, online: 
<https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Constitution”]. 
13  Beverley McLachlin, “Canadian Rights and Freedoms: 20 Years Under the Charter”, 
Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “20 Years”]. 
14  Beverley McLachlin, “Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian 
Perspective” in Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in 
Pluralism, Religion, and Public Policy (Montréal: MQUP, 2014), at 22 [hereinafter “Religion”]. 
15  Beverley McLachlin, “Judges in a Multicultural Society” (October 2003), online: 
<www.lsuc.on.ca/media/mclachlin_judges_multicultura_society.pdf> at para. 8 [hereinafter 
“Multicultural”]. 
16  See e.g., Supreme Court of Canada, The Supreme Court of Canada and its Justices 1875-
2000 (Toronto: Dundurn, 2000), at 6 [hereinafter “SCC”]. 
17  Bhasin v. Hrynew, [2014] S.C.J. No. 71, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494, at para. 33 
(S.C.C.). 
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Interpretation: An Adjudicative Microcosm? 
One activity that is a staple of a court’s work is interpretation. The 
Chief Justice enjoys this task. She seems to appreciate its elements of 
discovery, of creativity (in the sense of problem-solving, not invention), 
and of expressiveness (Montesquieu’s bouche de la loi).18 Yet, she 
broaches the task with great humility. Far from drawing impressionistic 
conclusions, then going through the prescribed formalities for the sole 
sake of justification, she treats it as a quest: not knowing where she will 
end up until the journey’s end. Sometimes, that meant a different conclusion 
even than she anticipated following the post-hearing conference. As 
McLuhan said that the medium is the message,19 McLachlin might 
have said that the process is the point.20 But that process required her 
active participation at every step in order to arrive at the best possible 
interpretation. 
The interpretive philosophy embraced by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, and employed by Chief Justice McLachlin, was termed by 
Elmer Driedger simply the “modern” principle:21  
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an 
Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and 
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of 
the Act, and the intention of Parliament.22 
But what it calls for is harmony among the various interpretive 
considerations: text, context, scheme, and purposes. Out of that harmony, 
sounds the interpretation sought. 
                                                                                                                       
18  See e.g., Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003) 88 [hereinafter “Dickson”]. 
19  Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: Mentor, 
1964). 
20  Indeed, speaking of the judicial task generally, she has said that “public support for the 
courts is not tied to the popularity of any one opinion; rather, it appears that public approval of the 
Court is tied to the perceived integrity of the judicial process”: Beverley McLachlin, “The Role of 
Judges in Modern Society”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Role of 
Judges”]. See also her statement, in the Conclusion to this volume, “I’ve always been a process 
person”: “Kirk Makin in Conversation with The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin — Chief 
Justice McLachlin in Her Own Words”, at 330. 
21  Elmer Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd. edition (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983). 
22  Id., See e.g., Rizzo v. Rizzo Shoes, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.); Bell 
ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42, at para. 26 
(S.C.C.): “Driedger’s modern approach has been repeatedly cited by this Court as the preferred 
approach to statutory interpretation across a wide range of interpretive settings”. 
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Hence, when in a mentoring moment the Chief Justice said to me 
“interpretation is everything”,23 I wondered whether harmony might be a 
better conceptualization than balance of her approach to legal problem-
solving overall: Was it a search for a harmonious resolution of the legal 
issues posed? For a resolution that would achieve harmony among the 
legitimate considerations to be accounted for? 
Harmony was indeed another term she used in cases and public lectures 
discussing legal ideals.24 Moreover, the various other conceptualizations, it 
seemed to me, converged on it. Meanwhile, the more I studied her work, 
whether the product or the process, the more that harmony emerged as a 
theme — often not explicit (interpretation being one exception), but very 
often powerfully implicit. To what extent was this particular conception a 
conscious focus for her, versus a quality achieved in practice, reflecting 
an acute appreciation at some subconscious level? I don’t know. But 
whether or not it was consciously so prominent for her, or so perceived 
by others, for me at least, it echoed the intuitive understanding of her 
approach previously mentioned. 
Justice as Harmony 
Beyond merely presenting a different metaphor, how might harmony 
offer a better conceptual vehicle than balance for understanding Chief 
Justice McLachlin’s framework for resolving legal problems? Two broad 
answers can be posited, which should emerge more clearly throughout the 
course of this article. First, harmony constitutes a different aim — one that 
is more complex and ambitious than balance. Indeed, to achieve harmony 
might well mean, in some cases, a commensurate imbalance, or require in 
other cases the striking of several simultaneous balances of different 
factors operating at different levels. Harmony further supplies an answer 
                                                                                                                       
23  Her public remarks confirm such an understanding of interpretation as definitive of the 
judicial role: “The task of the judiciary is to interpret the laws passed by the legislatures as well as the 
common law, and to resolve disputes … in accordance”, and quoting Chief Justice Dickson that “it is 
only where the law is interpreted by an independent judiciary with vision, a sense of purpose, and a 
profound sensitivity to society’s values, that the rule of law [is] safe”: Beverley McLachlin, “The 
Supreme Court of Canada”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “On SCC”]. 
Where values are at variance, she adds, “the judge must become the interpreter of difference”: 
Beverley McLachlin, “Second International Conference on the Training of the Judiciary”, Remarks, 
online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Training Judiciary”]. 
24  See e.g., 20 Years, supra, note 13; Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73, at para. 49 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Haida”]; B010 v. Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 58, 2015 SCC 58, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.). 
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as to why (and when) it might be desirable to strike a balance: namely, 
where it is necessary to achieve harmony among conflicting legitimate 
considerations. Second, the process for pursuing harmony as an aim is 
significantly more diverse and sophisticated than balancing. In some 
circumstances, it might well involve balancing. But in others, it will call 
for different legal skills such as reconciliation, accommodation, a search 
for common ground, or the negotiation of compromise. 
If these hypotheses harbour some truth, then the concept of harmony 
as a way of understanding a characteristic quality of the Chief Justice’s 
oeuvre is worthy of study. In this article, I hope to break initial ground on 
that, relying primarily though not exclusively on public lectures by the 
Chief Justice, wherein she had opportunities to illuminate what she saw 
as the functional objectives, outlook, and operating procedures that lay 
behind the output of the Court — being the judgments themselves. As the 
discussion thus far may suggest, my examination and interpretation of 
these is from the standpoint of searching for the best way of understanding 
the challenge of resolving legal problems strictly in terms of consistency 
with my experience as an apprentice to Chief Justice McLachlin. I will 
not address conceivable evolution, experimentation, or variation in her 
style in conflict with that, much less address judicial aims and processes 
as a general field of inquiry, or the broader general proposition of legal 
problem-solving. 
With that in mind, this first foray will address two overarching questions: 
One is to explore the nature of the pursuit of harmony as an averred theme 
in Chief Justice McLachlin’s work. Along the way, it must be clarified 
what harmony means in that context, and how it can be pursued. The 
other question concerns harmony’s potential wider significance for law 
and for society. To the extent it captures something significant in Chief 
Justice McLachlin’s philosophy, how does it compare to other common 
approaches to the judicial task? Should harmony be better appreciated as 
a judicial aim, as a legal virtue, as a priority of civic leadership, as a 
vision and process of seeking justice in our society? 
Structure of this Article 
The sequence of this exploration will proceed as follows: Part I 
begins by reflecting on the relationship between harmony, law, and the 
pursuit of a just social order. Harmony’s association with the just order is 
surveyed, and the question of how our legal system leaves room for 
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harmony is addressed. Part II fixes on the nuts and bolts of what 
harmony means in this context as an aim of legal problem-solving, and 
what process is entailed in pursuing it. Part III compares it to other 
approaches to resolving legal problems. Different applications of it are 
overviewed in Part IV, with examples or relevant commentary by the 
Chief Justice. Part V briefly considers a few potential factors in Beverley 
McLachlin’s perfection of this technique. 
I. HARMONY, LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF A JUST SOCIAL ORDER 
1. Harmony’s Association with the Just Social Order 
Far from a novel or exotic notion, harmony has throughout the world 
and throughout history been central to many cultures’ conception of a 
just order. Undoubtedly, harmony has somewhat different meanings 
across cultural contexts. But certainly there appears to be a significant 
overlap among these, a fact reflected in the sharing of that terminology. 
And the concept itself (in any of these incarnations) is sufficiently broad 
as to allow us to focus on a common core without undue fear that all 
meaning is thereby lost. For these reasons, I prefer to rely on common 
understandings, despite or perhaps because of potential variations, and 
shall not endorse any particular conception or definition of harmony.  
While a comprehensive account of the conceptual life and work of 
harmony across cultures is far outside the ambit of this work — and no 
doubt to be better accomplished by an anthropologist than a lawyer — a 
brief look at a few examples of harmony’s association with different 
cultures’ ideal of a just order is important here for the purpose of 
illustrating how remarkably pervasive that association is. 
In Aboriginal-American cultures, it has been said that the way to 
understand “traditional Indigenous legal orders [is] as embodiments of 
distinctive Indigenous approaches to restoring harmony within 
communities”:25  
Indigenous legal orders in Canada are diverse; each stems from a 
particular vision of ecological order and each is rooted in a distinct 
language, tradition and worldview. Together, though, the sources 
indicate that four important things must be kept in mind when 
approaching the legal traditions of Indigenous peoples on this land. 
                                                                                                                       
25  Michael Coyle, “Indigenous Legal Orders in Canada — a literature review” (2017) 92 
Law Publications, v 4 [hereinafter “Coyle”]. 
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First, those traditions tend to place a central focus, not on individual 
“rights”, but on maintaining harmonious relationships among members 
of the community and between the community, the land, and other life-
forms ...26 
That this understanding of harmony reaches well beyond social 
harmony is highlighted by the fact that the “traditional Indigenous focus on 
harmonious relationships generally includes accountability to the natural 
world, a stewardship-like concept”.27 Accordingly, the fundamental values 
of the Cheyenne people of the Prairies/Great Plains are said to include 
“respect for the spirit world; desire for harmony and well-being in 
interpersonal relationships; desire for harmony and balance with nature”.28 
And for the Sto:ló people of British Columbia, the key term 
“qui:quelstóm” is translated as “a way of living in harmony”.29 
Harmony has also been closely associated with visions of the just 
order in Eastern cultures. For instance, “[t]he popularity of ‘harmonious 
society’ in China has deep political, economic and cultural roots”.30 In 
that context, the association encompasses, notably: 
… traditional Chinese perspectives on dispute and dispute resolution, 
which are deeply shaped by Confucian doctrines, especially the concept 
of “harmony” … “Harmony”, in Confucian understanding, means “an 
orderly combination of different elements, by which a new unity comes 
into being”. This new unity brings a state of peace and stability to the 
relationships between human beings and nature, between different 
hierarchies of society, and between individuals. In this sense, a 
harmonious society does not eliminate controversies but instead 
maintains them to a manageable extent and solves them in effective 
ways.31 
In disfavour during China’s Cultural Revolution, this traditional 
perspective has enjoyed a “resurgence” in the 21st century “throughout 
the entire legal system in China”.32 The official government aim of 
“constructing ‘socialist harmonious society’” is a “restating” of the 
traditional perspective on “the importance of maintaining harmonious 
                                                                                                                       
26  Id., at vi. 
27  Id. 
28  Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission, “Aboriginal Concepts of Justice” in Report of 
the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, v1 (1999), online: <http://www.ajic.mb.ca/volumel/toc.html>. 
29  Coyle, supra, note 25, at 7. 
30  Wei Pei, “Harmony, Law and Criminal Reconciliation in China: A Historical 
Perspective” (2016) 9 Erasmus L.R. 18, at 20. 
31  Id. 
32  Id., at 20-22. 
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relationships between individuals, between the government and people, 
between human beings and nature, and between China and foreign 
countries”.33 
Religious cultures have also perceived a connection between harmony 
and the just order. For example, in Christian teaching: 
Justice toward men disposes one to respect the rights of each and to 
establish in human relationships the harmony that promotes equity with 
regard to persons and to the common good.34 
This notion is elaborated in the theology of Aquinas, which sees the 
virtue of justice as distinct from the other virtues by its social, rather than 
individual, vocation. Its first branch, “legal justice”, provides that 
“everyone who is a member of a community stands to that community as 
a part to a whole … For this reason, we should expect the good 
community to enact laws that will govern its members in ways that are 
beneficial to everyone”.35 The second branch, “distributive justice”, 
dealing with the apportionment of goods and responsibilities within the 
community, “seeks to preserve equality” which is “not a matter of equal 
quantity but ‘due proportion’”.36 
Harmony is also a term often used in association with order and 
justice in attempting to translate complex concepts within the core of the 
Dharmic faiths. 
Beyond religious groups, harmony has further been associated with a 
salubrious order in the context of other sorts of communities. Two such 
contexts recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada include the 
family37 and labour.38  
The picture in “official” Western legal systems is more complicated.39 
Harmony figures in notable philosophies, from the ancient Greeks (per 
                                                                                                                       
33  Id., at 28. 
34  Catechism of the Catholic Church, at para. 1807. 
35  “Thomas Aquinas: Moral Philosophy” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online: 
<https://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-moral/> [hereinafter “IEP”]. 
36  Id. 
37  See e.g., Young v. Young, [1993] S.C.J. No. 112, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at 80 (S.C.C.); 
Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] S.C.J. No. 41, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753, at para. 47 (S.C.C.). 
38  See e.g., Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 
1016, 2001 SCC 94, at paras. 172, 192 (S.C.C.). 
39  I am referring here to law associated with sovereign states, and the statement therefore 
excludes what, from a legal pluralism standpoint, might be viewed as Western non-state “legal 
systems”. I also exclude forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, where the 
concept of harmony may operate more straightforwardly. While interestingly, such forms of ADR 
are increasingly being co-opted into playing roles in the official legal system … that movement, in a 
sense, is part of the larger point. 
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the discussion in Section II.1(a) below), to Aquinas (mentioned above), 
to Kant (referenced in Section V). Philosophies involving harmony have, 
in turn, been influential in Western legal thought. Mediated by these 
philosophies, harmony has played a central role in defining justice, 
where justice is the aim of the legal system, similar to that association in 
other cultures. Beyond that, the earlier philosophies were a source of 
important constructs of Western law: due (and not undue) punishment in 
Criminal Law; proportionality in Constitutional Law; restitution in 
Private Law, as merely a few examples.40 The earlier and modern 
philosophies also remain prominent in contemporary academic theory. 
Thus, in an indirect and often implicit way, harmony has had 
considerable impact in Western law. 
But within the legal system itself, harmony’s role is confined to the 
extent to which it is embodied in the rules that comprise the system. The 
extent of its embodiment in the rules is limited by the strong 
individualistic and weak communitarian focus of Western law.41 
Moreover, the system does not foresee a distinct role for harmony 
beyond the rules. Western legal systems’ elaborate sets of rules are 
treated as sufficient, at any given time, to answer any question that 
requires a legal answer. The inboard presumption is that there is no need 
for a system to have recourse, distinct from the rules, to harmony as a 
guiding concept: to whatever extent harmony should bear on legal 
answers, it has been incorporated in rules which apply it in a more 
precise manner to more specific problems.  
But as discussed in the succeeding Section I.2, the rules are — and 
will forever be — insufficient. Thus, although the system aspires to a just 
order, associated as elsewhere with harmony, the fiction of the system’s 
claim to “completeness” cuts it off, in resolving insufficiencies, from 
further nourishment by the concept in aspiration of which the system is at 
some level considered to be born, and that the rules to some extent 
embody. In this way, the influence of harmony is attenuated in official 
Western legal systems. 
This is acutely significant in the context of adjudication. As detailed 
in the next section, Chief Justice McLachlin has emphasized that the 
judicial function serves to resolve insufficiencies in the rules as they 
constantly reveal themselves in the legal problems that underlie disputes 
                                                                                                                       
40  On the claim that harmony was a source for proportionality, see Thomas Poole, 
“Proportionality in Perspective”, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 16/2010. 
41  I thank Professor Helge Dedek for this important observation, the factors behind which 
are outside the scope of the present article. This facet is touched on again within Section II.1 below. 
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calling for adjudication. From the standpoint of the system’s aim of just 
order, associated with harmony, in turn concerned with the proper 
relationship among elements of the system and between elements and the 
whole, the insufficiency to be resolved in each case represents a 
particular constellation of elements whose proper interrelationships had 
not been worked out by the system — a disharmony. The judicial 
function itself, the Chief Justice adds, cannot be reduced to rules, but 
involves an essential human element. Inevitably, that element falls to the 
independence of each judge to decide how they will conceive of and 
execute. Induced perhaps by the adversarialism of Western legal systems’ 
focus on disputation (as discussed in Section III), adjudication is often 
approached through the lens of conflict: ending the dispute by taking 
sides, but meanwhile compounding the system disharmony. By contrast, 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s characteristic efforts appear consistent with a 
philosophy of striving to resolve legal problems in a way that would 
restore harmony to the system. 
2. The Complementarity of Harmony and Legal Rules within a Just 
Legal Order 
If harmony has, at least thus far, not played a role as a distinct and 
guiding principle within Western official legal systems, how is it that it 
could have characterized the approach of Chief Justice McLachlin, as 
suggested? The almost universal acclaim for the way in which she 
performed her official duties excludes any figment that she might have 
short-changed the expectations incumbent on a leading jurist of such a 
system and instead followed some other legal tradition in what, as legal 
transplants go, would amount to a brain transplant. If my claim 
concerning Chief Justice McLachlin’s pursuit of harmonious resolutions 
is at all accurate, the praise she has earned also implies a strong 
complementarity between what an official Western legal system requires 
and what a philosophy aiming to achieve harmony allows, when used in 
synchrony, judged by those in or subject to the system.  
(a) The Insufficiency of Legal Rules 
What would explain, and shape, this complementarity? Like others 
with a sophisticated view of the law, Beverley McLachlin recognized as 
“myth that if the judge looks hard enough and long enough and wisely 
16 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
enough, the judge will find in the law the single clear answer to the 
question before her”.42 Elaborate as a set of legal rules may be, it does 
not always provide complete answers to legal problems. And when those 
legal problems yield disputes, “there must be an institution to resolve 
what the law requires … That institution, quite simply, is the courts”.43 
The insufficiency of the set of rules is manifold. 
(i) Imprecision 
It includes the inevitable imprecision of the rules’ expression. As the 
Chief Justice put it, “legal rules can be no more precise or absolute than 
the words of which they consist … The meanings of words vary from 
person to person and from context to context”.44 The judge is therefore 
called to decide rules’ meaning through the process of interpretation. 
(ii) Incompleteness 
Insufficiency also results from the incompleteness of the rules. That 
is, sometimes legal problems present themselves that no rule of the 
system responds to. This could be because of a legal oversight, or 
because the problem is novel and was therefore unanticipated when the 
rules were made. One way of interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Carter on assisted-dying is that its prior decision in Rodriguez had 
already become a dead letter, due to its reliance on a context that had 
since changed, such that the trial court was not defying a Supreme Court 
precedent, but providing an answer where the law was incomplete as a 
result of a prior answer having, by its own terms, been rendered 
obsolete.45 Where the rules, for whatever reason, are incomplete, the 
judge is tasked with filling “gaps” in the law.  
                                                                                                                       
42  Beverley McLachlin, “Judging in a Democratic State”, Remarks, online: 
<https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Democratic State”]. 
43  Id. 
44  Beverley McLachlin, “Rules and Discretion in the Governance of Canada” (1992) 56 
Sask. L. Rev. 167, at 171 [hereinafter “Rules & Discretion”]. 
45  See e.g., Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, 
2015 SCC 5, at para. 44 (S.C.C.). 
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(iii) Indeterminacy 
Where multiple rules conflict, and it is unclear which of them governs 
a particular problem, the indeterminacy of that answer results in a further 
insufficiency in the system of rules. As the Chief Justice explains:  
[W]hich of two conflicting rules should be applied? ... Scholars call this 
the problem of indeterminacy in the law … Instead of being presented 
with one single certain answer, judges must choose between different 
answers, each of which may be argued to be “correct”.46  
(iv) Fixity 
The inherently dynamic character of the law discloses another 
insufficiency in the rules as they exist at any particular point in time. 
Legal rules are created in pursuit of particular objectives (and in Canada, 
which as noted has endorsed Driedger’s approach, are indeed purposive). 
Accordingly, a fixed rule is one whose fixity, at some level, reflects its 
embeddedness in context. When confronted with a new context, judges 
must determine whether the existing rule applies “as is”, or whether it 
can and should be refined (or whether the law is actually incomplete and 
a new rule is needed). As Chief Justice McLachlin says:  
It is impossible in writing the law or pronouncing a judgment to 
envision all the situations which may arise in the future. When a new 
and unforeseen situation arises, it brings with it questions. Does a 
particular legal rule apply to the new situation? … Or, if a certain rule 
appears to apply, does it need to be modified to do justice in the new 
situation?47 
(v) Abstraction 
Additional insufficiency of the rules emerges from the law’s need for 
application. The law is not self-applying. As the Chief Justice states, “our 
job as judges … is to settle questions about … how it should be 
applied”.48 The law could not rely on “a robot for a judge”,49 she adds, 
because application is not merely a matter of logic and evidence, but also 
of fitting abstract rules to the real world, and of practical sense, and 
                                                                                                                       
46  Democratic State, supra, note 42. 
47  Id. 
48  On SCC, supra, note 23. 
49  Democratic State, supra, note 42. 
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judgment.50 The issue here is not greater precision in the terms of rules in 
the abstract, discussed earlier, but translation of those terms into the real-
life terms that cases involve. Identifying the proper correspondence is not 
a matter of computation: it is not a mathematical translation that is 
required, but a human translation from conceptual meaning to concrete 
experience.  
These needs are particularly acute in the case of rules that provide 
only broad guidance while relying on judicial discretion to take account 
of case-specific circumstances unknown or unappreciable by a 
legislature. In McLachlin C.J.C.’s words, “judges faced with this sort of 
language must shape and carve and sometimes limit it, like a sculptor 
shapes a stone, finding the ultimate shape within the undefined block”.51 
(vi) Unjustification 
Lastly, the law’s need for legitimation admits a further insufficiency. 
Here, I do not mean merely a theoretical construct of its legitimation as 
emanating from sources authorized by and according to conditions 
prescribed by the legal order itself, whose legitimacy critics have also 
questioned.52 The Chief Justice is concerned with “the problem of 
legitimacy”53 in real terms — that is, as a matter of the perception of 
present stakeholders, and above all “public confidence in the legal 
process. Only when it is absent does one realize how vital it is to the rule 
of law and how difficult it is to achieve”.54 Without it, people “will not 
settle their disputes through the courts. They will not obey court orders. 
Judgments become” mere words or “clanging bells, full of sound and 
fury, but signifying nothing”.55 Sustaining legitimacy means that, 
regardless of the rule, “justice must also be delivered in a responsive 
manner, one that takes account of the social context” through judicial 
decision-making processes and justification.56 
                                                                                                                       
50  NZ, supra, note 11, at 3. 
51  Rules & Discretion, supra, note 44, at 171. 
52  See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, “Déclarations d’Indépendance” in Otobiographies: 
l’enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre (Paris: Galilée, 1984), at 13-32, arguing 
that legal orders are born of legal rupture, and hence ultimately rest on illegitimate foundations. 
53  Democratic State, supra, note 42. 
54  Beverley McLachlin, “Judicial Independence”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/>. 
55  Beverley McLachlin, “The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media”, Remarks, 
online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/>. 
56  Training Judiciary, supra, note 23. 
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(vii) The Law’s Needs Beyond the Law’s Rules  
Together, then, these facets of the rules — their imprecision, 
incompleteness, indeterminacy, dynamic character, and need for 
application and legitimation — reveal the rules’ insufficiency. And the 
judge must make up for this in each case through, respectively: 
interpretation; filling gaps; resolving conflicts among rules; developing 
the law; applying the law; and employing decision-making processes and 
justifications that strengthen rather than weaken the law’s “living” 
legitimacy. How might a judge tackle this task? 
(b) The “Modern” Approach to Dealing with the Rules’ Insufficiency? 
Chief Justice McLachlin observes that: “The role of judges is simply 
stated. Describing how judges actually go about discharging their duties, 
however, is more difficult. Over the years, myths have grown up — myths 
that obscure the true nature and challenge of judging”.57 Chief among 
these is “the myth of the declaratory theory” — just addressed: that the set 
of legal rules within a legal system is sufficient to answer all the legal 
problems generated by the society it governs. And the opposite myth is that 
the law is nothing more than judges’ “idiosyncratic application of personal 
preferences”.58 This would not be law at all, but arbitrary rule. As the Chief 
Justice spells out:  
It is not for judges to … impose their personal views on society. The 
role of judges is to support the rule of law, not the rule of judicial 
whim. Judges are human beings; but they must strive to judge 
impartially after considering the facts, the law and the submissions of 
parties on all sides of the question.59 
Equally inappropriate is to pour political ideology into the space left 
by legal rules’ insufficiency. Chief Justice McLachlin declares that this 
“result-oriented, agenda-driven judging. I am the first to say that … this 
kind of judging would be bad”;60 it “breeds cynicism, and undermines 
public confidence in all of our institutions”.61 This is because “legislation 
                                                                                                                       
57  Democratic State, supra, note 42. 
58  Macfarlane, supra, note 2, at 58. 
59  Beverley McLachlin, “Respecting Democratic Roles”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-
csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Democratic Roles”]. 
60  Beverley McLachlin, “Courts, Legislatures, and Executives in the Post-Charter Era” 
(1999) 20:3 Policy Options 43 [hereinafter “Courts Legislatures Executives”]. 
61  Democratic Roles, supra, note 59. 
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is often the product of compromise or conflict between various political 
factions, each faction pushing its own agenda. The judicial arena does 
not, and should not, provide simply another forum for the same kind of 
contests”.62 Such ideological “judicial activism” is self-defeating in the 
long run anyway: there is a native elasticity in the law, but pulled on too 
hard from one end, Newton’s Third Law reminds us that every action 
produces an equal and opposite reaction.63 In the meantime, harm is done 
to the Rule of Law, and all that rides on it.  
Chief Justice McLachlin concludes that “the true nature of judging 
seems to me to lie somewhere between” either assuming the rules are 
complete or else trivializing their existence by parachuting in ready-
made answers belonging to other normative systems.64 It is therefore a 
matter of trying to extrapolate from the partial-answers to be found 
within the existing set of rules what would provide the best answer to the 
new problem at hand: “Judges have no choice but to give the answer that 
in the end, after deep reflection and consideration of all relevant facts 
and rules, they conclude is best”.65 This can be done in different ways, 
whether regularized or ad hoc. Each way embraces a complementarity 
between the rules and the approach used to transcend their insufficiency. 
Harmony is one such way, for what it will suggest is only intelligible 
by reference to the elements, relationships among elements, and 
relationships between elements and the whole, that it consists in. As 
applied to legal problem-solving, those elements include the various 
rules and their insufficiencies to be found in the legal system, as well as 
relevant and legally recognized aspects of the subject and context of the 
problem to which they are being applied. Harmony is therefore among 
the approaches faithful to the system. But as between it and other 
approaches sharing that fidelity to the law as a system, harmony, with its 
pervasive association with the just order, is best-suited to guide such a 
process not simply to some answer to the legal problem, but to one that 
achieves the end of a just order. By no means can it ensure such a result, 
either in a particular case or across a court’s docket, for all the usual 
reasons why adjudication is an imperfect science. But at least it is a 
conception oriented towards that aspiration, incorporating holistic and  
 
                                                                                                                       
62  Role of Judges, supra, note 20. 
63  Isaac Newton, Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (London: Pepys, 1687): 
“Law III: To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction”. 
64  Macfarlane, supra, note 2, at 58. 
65  Democratic State, supra, note 42. 
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individual elements and their complex interrelationship. As the Chief 
Justice states, “in performing this function [of seeking answers], judges 
inevitably are expected to perform a second function, namely, to ensure 
that the law develops in a way that is good for society and the men, 
women and children who are its members”.66 In short, “a good decision 
is one that is just, according to law”.67 Harmony ideally complements the 
corpus of legal rules, with which it shares the same ultimate end: “A civil 
society is an ordered society; but it is more: it is also a society concerned 
to ensure the conditions for collective and individual human 
flourishing”.68 
Thus, much as the modern approach to interpretation seeks harmony 
among text, context, scheme, and purposes, the “modern” approach to 
the broader judicial task responds to any brand of insufficiency apt to be 
resolved in that forum by seeking the answer which understands the 
problem in context, and in relation to it, best attains harmony among the 
relevant legal criteria and their purposes, including the legal system’s 
ultimate intention of promoting order and justice in society: “a just 
society and the rule of law”.69 This is the style characteristic of the work 
of Chief Justice McLachlin. 
II.  HARMONY AS AN AIM AND AS A PROCESS OF RESOLVING  
LEGAL PROBLEMS 
At this juncture, it may be useful to drill down further on what 
harmony means in this context as an overall aim of legal problem-
solving, and what process is entailed in pursuing it. If it might be the case 
that this offers a worthwhile way of addressing the challenge of resolving 
legal problems, or even just a serviceable conceptual vehicle for thinking 
about that task, it must be explained such that it is neither nebulous nor 
left to the discrete imagination of each reader. 
                                                                                                                       
66  Beverley McLachlin, “The Supreme Court and the Public Interest” (2001) 64 Sask. L. 
Rev. 309, at 311 [hereinafter “Public Interest”]. 
67  Beverley McLachlin, “Respecting Democratic Roles”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-
csc.ca/>. 
68  NZ, supra, note 11, at 29. 
69  Beverley McLachlin, “Recipient of the G. Arthur Martin Medal from the Criminal 
Lawyers’ Association”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Martin Medal”]. 
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1. Harmony as an Aim of Legal Problem-Solving 
(a) The Harmonious Resolution of Legal Issues 
In using the term “harmony” to describe a distinctive feature of what 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s resolutions of legal issues aspire to achieve, 
what is contemplated? It refers to an approach attuned to how a 
legal problem involves an ensemble of certain interrelated legal 
considerations, and which strives to resolve the problem through a 
certain composition of those considerations. The composition sought is 
one noteworthy for ensuring that the issue is heard as part of the way the 
composition orchestrates the collective expression of the ensemble. 
Breaking this down further, a number of characteristics can be 
identified in the resolution of a legal issue which is successful in 
achieving harmony. 
Preliminarily, one discerns that it is attained by a response 
preoccupied not with decision-making but with problem-solving. Chief 
Justice McLachlin describes a similar outlook on the part of Chief Justice 
Dickson: “whether we call it imagination, whether we call it flexibility”, 
what stood out was “the way he approached problems”; and she adds, 
“I learned an enormous amount from him about judging”.70 Elsewhere, in 
describing the judicial task, she refers to the “challenge of governance”,71 
and to “finding solutions”.72 This focus on problem-solving rather than 
decision-making is important because it frames the nature of the exercise 
that will follow. 
A key characteristic of a resolution that achieves harmony is 
consciousness that no legal problem is a singular matter; each consists in 
a unique ensemble of multiple interrelated legal considerations. By this, 
I mean elements the law ought to take into account, whether because 
they are (already) recognized as or by legal authority, or because the 
social purposes served by the law so demand. In fact, these may not be 
strictly separable: as Chief Justice McLachlin highlights, “the idea that 
there’s some law out there that has nothing to do with consequences and 
how it plays out in the real world is an abstract and inaccurate 
representation of what the law is”.73 Legitimate considerations could be 
                                                                                                                       
70  Dickson, supra, note 18, at 88. 
71  Training Judiciary, supra, note 23. 
72  Beverley McLachlin, “Preface,” in Dame Mary Arden, Common Law and Modern 
Society (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
73  Florian Sauvageau, et al., Last Word: Media Coverage of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), at 164. 
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substantive, procedural, institutional, remedial, relational, or of some 
other level, depending on the issue. The qualifier “legitimate” is to 
exclude factors that are improper, irrelevant to the immediate issue, etc. 
However, the problem and its potential solution are not isolated, but 
dwell within a broader system, so that other background considerations 
(such as human dignity, or the Rule of Law) may be pertinent, or in the 
case of the system’s ultimate object of a just order, an overarching 
interest that guides the composition of the others. 
This composition of the considerations is another basic characteristic 
of a harmonious resolution of a legal problem. It requires figuring how 
these various constituents should be fit together, in the context given, to 
respond to the issue in the way that best gives effect to the ensemble of 
factors from the standpoint of the overall system intent of a just order of 
them as a collective. In turn, this relies on a belief that it is possible and 
preferable for legal solutions to give expression to multiple interests; that 
is, in the words of the Chief Justice, “It follows from what I have said 
that we cannot view the problem in terms of ‘either-or’,” among values 
at stake.74 However, the various values’ expression cannot be simply 
aggregated either, for they are incommensurable; it must be orchestrated, 
and attend to how they can together produce harmony. Isolated interests 
together constitute a whole, while the whole is composed of various 
isolable interests. Within the whole, each value has its proper place, plays 
a particular role, and dwells in due proportion. To put it in social terms, 
“the goal”, the Chief Justice explains, “is decisions that best represent the 
interests of the community as a whole”,75 bearing in mind “the fact, 
proven through the millennia, that human beings can realize themselves 
only as part of a larger group”.76 Given the factors’ incommensurability, 
justice can only be achieved by skilfully ascertaining and achieving their 
composition in a way that reflects their particular positions and 
distinctive roles in the ensemble, a feature impossible to explain more 
precisely but universally than through the notion of harmony.  
Used to describe this endeavour, the aspiration to achieve harmony in 
resolving legal problems makes for an approach to judicial decision-
making that is complex and often difficult. Chief Justice McLachlin 
explains: 
                                                                                                                       
74  Beverley McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?”, 
Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Unwritten Constitution”]. 
75  Multicultural, supra, note 15, at para. 8. 
76  NZ, supra, note 11, at 30. 
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The first difficulty is the intellectual and moral effort of struggling to 
find the best answer. The judge must not only evaluate the legal options 
but understand the implications of doing so. These may be complex and 
polycentric. Changing one rule may impact in myriad ways on other 
rules and legal values. Legal philosopher Lon Fuller likened the judge’s 
task to pulling on one strand of a spider’s web; in doing so she changes 
not only the strand on which she is pulling, but rearranges all the other 
strands as well. It is thus not surprising that judges may agonize long 
and hard in arriving at their ultimate conclusions on the law.77 
The greater the number of considerations involved (e.g., existing legal 
authorities, social realities to be governed), and the more intricate their 
interrelationship, the more challenging that task becomes. 
In an extended passage from a public lecture offering precious 
insight into the big picture of this task, Chief Justice McLachlin tells a 
story from the Protagoras, “one of the greatest Socratic dialogues”, in 
which Plato asks Socrates “the basic conditions of human society”.78 
His answer, she relates in modern terms, is “two qualities — legal order 
and a shared sense of belonging, restraint and responsibility”.79 When 
disputes arise, it falls to judges to ensure these qualities’ fulfilment. She 
goes on to explain that through “the deliberative function”, judges 
“work out the myriad accommodations that make up the fabric of civil 
society … Conflicting interests are addressed, compromises worked 
out. The result is the body of rules by which we maintain social 
order”.80 Thus, “to sum up, the law makes the project of human beings 
living together possible by providing social order through governance, 
and a deliberative process by which groups and individuals work out 
their disputes and make the accommodations that allow peaceful co-
existence”.81 Most vitally, she states that: “If, like Zeus in Socrates 
metaphor, our goal is to find a way in which people can live together in 
peace, harmony and productivity, we will seek not only the law, but law 
whose content will promote those goals”.82 The story is told from the 
perspective of people, whom the legal system exists to serve; but for 
their living experience to be that of a just order … a just order must 
first be composed in the mind of the judge, orchestrating the 
                                                                                                                       
77  Democratic State, supra, note 42. 
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79  Id. 
80  Id., at 32. 
81  Id., at 33. 
82  Id., at 35. 
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considerations involved as directly or indirectly affecting people, 
drawing on a mix of methods such as she describes.  
Hence, to achieve harmony in resolving a legal problem is to respect 
all relevant legitimate considerations, and to identify the legal response 
which, in addressing the problem, best gives collective expression to 
these elements as part of an integral system of just order. 
(b) Incongruous Uses of “Harmony” as a Legal Term 
In order to avoid any confusion about the meaning of harmony in the 
context described here, it may help to dispel ambiguity by noting some 
other law-related uses of the term that are not what the term refers to in 
this article. All are faithful to “harmony” as a notion, but employ it in 
different spheres, focusing on harmony within a specific subject-class. 
These other usages may be encompassed by the one here, but are 
underinclusive of it, and on their own would distort a reader’s 
appreciation of what the term refers to in this article’s discussion. 
Examining the interrelationship of the various uses may help bring  
into sharper relief the usage of the term made here, described in  
Section II.1(a). 
(i) Social Harmony 
The term “harmony” is sometimes used as a short-form for “social 
harmony”. What harmony refers to in this article may, in some cases, 
include social harmony as one of the legitimate interests. This would be 
the case, for instance, in Family Law where spousal harmony is linked to 
the best interests of children.83 It would likewise be so in Labour Law, 
where harmonious labour relations have been recognized as a regulatory 
objective.84 It may well be a background consideration in most cases: the 
Chief Justice speaks of “the creation of a harmonious society where 
every individual feels not only accepted but truly welcome”.85 However, 
what harmony refers to in this article is far from limited to social 
harmony constituting, in some cases, one factor in resolving disputes. 
Moreover, social harmony may conflict with the type of harmony 
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described in this article where social harmony is used, in socio-legal 
contexts, to refer to a norm antithetical to litigation and/or impartial 
systems of dispute-resolution based on the application of legal 
principle.86 
(ii) Harmony as Uniformity 
The term “harmony” may also be employed to describe different laws 
or standards’ concordance. The process of “approximation or 
coordination” which brings laws into some uniformity is sometimes 
referred to as “harmonization”.87 This is the case, for instance, in EU Law, 
where questions often arise of “maximum” (full) versus “minimum” 
(partial) harmonization.88 This use of the term may be encompassed by 
the harmony that is the subject of this article in scenarios where striving 
for uniformity is an appropriate way of composing items. For instance, 
on the legislative front, Canada has a set of “harmonization” statutes, 
serving the need to co-ordinate federal law with Quebec civil law.89 
However, the harmony that is the subject of this article may be achieved 
by other means, and often must be, since pursuing uniformity is not 
appropriate where, for instance, the relevant elements reflect disparate 
considerations. 
(iii) Harmony as Coherence 
The word “harmony” is also sometimes used in the sense of 
coherence, internal consistency, or avoidance of repugnancy within the 
provisions or operational logic of a body of law. Interpretation’s “Golden 
Rule” is a far-reaching example.90 The judgment of McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) in Hall v. Hebert, that the Tort doctrine of illegality was 
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Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization” (2006) 40 R.J.T. 131, at 142. 
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concerned with the integrity of the justice system in the sense of 
“coherence … the need to prevent internal inconsistency in the law” is 
another example, famous throughout the common law.91 Harmony in the 
sense of coherence may often be part of what is required to achieve the 
broader meaning of harmony detailed in this article. After all, a just order 
must be ordered. But, a just order requires much more than coherence. 
And internal consistency is of little use in some situations, such as in 
dealing with expressly opposing considerations. 
2. Harmony as a Process of Legal Problem-Solving 
Having set out what harmony comprises as an overall aspiration in 
legal problem-solving, and having distinguished that from other law-
related uses of the term, the question arises: how can it be achieved? If it 
might provide a profitable way of conceiving of an aim of legal dispute-
resolution, the ability of those interested to put it into practice imposes a 
need for an account of the process for pursuing it. Because harmony is a 
quality of relationships between elements which differ from case to case, 
and because the task it guides is a human task,92 the process of pursuing 
harmony can only be described in broad terms, and beyond that 
necessarily relies on the judge’s experience, skills, instincts, and 
judgment combined with the particularities of each case. 
With that in mind, Chief Justice McLachlin sketched an overall 
picture of the process for pursuing the harmonious resolution of a legal 
problem in expressing that: 
The judge … She must struggle to enunciate the values at issue. Then 
she must attempt to strike the balance between the conflicting values 
which most closely conforms to justice as society, taken as a whole, 
sees it … to make decisions which are in the broader interests of 
society.93 
I now break down this process into its principal steps, and elaborate 
some of the facets each may involve.  
                                                                                                                       
91  Hall v. Hebert, [1993] S.C.J. No. 51, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, at 179 (S.C.C.). 
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envisages. 
93  Role of Judges, supra, note 20. 
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(a) Identifying the Considerations at Stake 
As the Chief Justice’s quote suggests, the first step in striving to 
achieve a harmonious resolution of a legal problem is to identify the 
considerations legitimately implicated by the problem: “Before they 
decide a difficult issue”, she explains, judges “should carefully consider 
and articulate the competing considerations”.94 The task is one of  
“‘recognition’ of the interests”95 in order to “ensure that all aspects of the 
problem are considered”,96 with attention to how some “values may be at 
risk of being overlooked or overridden”.97 
How might judges do this? There is no mechanistic procedure; but 
certain human postures are vital. The Chief Justice cites above all a 
distinct brand of impartiality, which I would describe as an “active 
omnipartiality”.98 Rather than just passively and impassively hearing the 
opposing parties, which is sufficient strictly to deciding partisan dispute, 
active omnipartiality is concerned with the legal problem underlying that 
dispute, and consists of actively “considering the problem from all 
sides”.99 More precisely, “the judge must seek to see and appreciate the 
point of view of each of the protagonists”,100 perceived through the self-
conscious lens of each of their “cultural commitments and assumptions, 
their particular voice and perspective”.101 In this way, the judge “takes 
into account (although not necessarily accepting) the parties’ conflicting 
                                                                                                                       
94  Multicultural, supra, note 15, at para. 32. 
95  Religion, supra, note 14, at 27. 
96  NZ, supra, note 11, at 5. 
97  Multicultural, supra, note 15, at para. 8. 
98  Chief Justice McLachlin has used a different phrase for this — “conscious objectivity”: 
see e.g., NZ, supra, note 11, at 6. However, what it refers to is much more complex, and perhaps 
different than what a literal or injudicious reading of that phrase may suggest. Partly, this stems from 
the fact that “objectivity” in law is still subjectivity, but non-particular (e.g., not the particular 
defendant, but a reasonable person, in the objective test of intention in Contracts or objective 
standard of fault in Criminal Law). In one sense, the process the Chief Justice describes is 
hypersubjective, in that it encourages active engagement with subjective perspectives, and not just 
one, but all that are relevant: see also her extensive discussion (joint with L’Heureux-Dubé J.) in  
R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] S.C.J. No. 84, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RDS”] in the context 
of racial profiling and official bias, where she explains how subjectivity is not only unavoidable but 
valuable. It is from the affirmative action that incorporates all subjective perspectives, besides the 
judge’s own, combined with use of a self-conscious lens in each instance, that impartiality or legal 
“objectivity” results. If this conscious objectivity (or active omnipartiality) is part of the proper 
adjudicative procedure, harmony might then be understood as its substantive counterpart in what it 
aims to help achieve. 
99  Dickson, supra, note 18, at 88. 
100  Role of Judges, supra, note 20. 
101  Training Judiciary, supra, note 23. 
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views on the facts, the law, and the interplay between them”.102 Beyond 
parties and perspectives, “the judge approaches the legal principles 
bearing on the question with the same” method.103 “This practice enables 
the judge to see all the ramifications of complex conflicts and arrive at 
accurate and fair characterizations of the issues”.104  
Achieving this active omnipartiality, in turn, requires openness. As the 
Chief Justice expounds, the “judge’s mind must be open and receptive to 
ideas and arguments”, because a “willingness to receive and act upon 
new and different ideas, arguments, and views lies at the heart” of the 
task.105 She clarifies that impartiality, in the sense of this active 
omnipartiality, “does not, like neutrality, require judges to rise above all 
values and perspectives. Rather, it requires judges to try, as far as they 
can, to open themselves to all perspectives … fairly taking into account 
all of the perspectives engaged”.106 
Besides openness, active omnipartiality seems to encompass a 
meditative aspect — “thoughtful reflection” — as she describes.107 
Identifying the legal interests invoked by a problem also depends on 
familiar modes of legal reasoning. Chief Justice McLachlin specifies that 
“deductive reasoning helps judges decide how to apply a general rule in a 
particular case. Inductive reasoning may assist judges in identifying the 
appropriate general rule. Often [they] are used together”.108 
Besides reasoning skills, identifying the values legitimately at stake in 
a legal problem requires a quality of attunement. As the Chief Justice 
declares:  
It no longer suffices to be a competent legal scholar and a fair arbiter. 
To perform their modern role well, judges must be sensitive to a broad 
range of social concerns. They must possess a keen appreciation of the 
importance of individual and group interests and rights. And they must 
be in touch with the society in which they work, understanding its 
values and its tensions.109 
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This ability is not strictly innate; Chief Justice McLachlin highlights 
how attunement to social context “now constitute[s] an important part of 
judicial education in many countries”.110 
On that note, the interests to be identified must themselves be 
understood and articulated in contextual, not abstract, terms. The Chief 
Justice describes this “technique” as one “which requires judges to 
examine issues in their full social context and with awareness to how 
they impact on people’s lives”.111 For example, in identifying the speech 
interest to be weighed against the legislative object in Canada (Attorney 
General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp.,112 McLachlin C.J.C. does not cast it in 
abstraction simply as “the right to freedom of expression”, but considers 
the context, in which the expression consists more particularly of tobacco 
advertising, so that “the expression at stake is of low value”.113 
In general, identifying the factors requires care as to their definition 
and delimitation. A distorted rendering of a consideration could short-
circuit the entire adjudicative analysis, leading to an unjust result; thus 
the judge “must learn to recognize her own biases, and struggle to keep 
them out”.114 Likewise, an insufficiently precise definition could lead to 
perceived conflict between multiple legitimate interests, which instead 
“should be resolved through the proper delineation of the rights and 
values involved”.115 The scope and bounds of each legal interest must be 
ascertained: “Past cases and hypothetical situations are analysed 
inductively to test how far a certain norm extends, or ought to extend”.116 
Factors that are prima facie identified as relevant must also be filtered 
to remove those in some way illegitimate in resolving the legal problem 
at hand. That is, they must be screened to keep out those which would, 
for some reason, be inappropriate to take into account. One example 
would be facts known to the judge but which are not in evidence, nor a 
proper subject for judicial notice. Public opinion polls on a matter sub 
judice would, in most cases, constitute another example. 
                                                                                                                       
110  Training Judiciary, supra, note 23. 
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(b) Piecing Together the Considerations 
As alluded to in the initial sketch by Chief Justice McLachlin of what 
depicts the overall process of striving to achieve a harmonious resolution 
of a legal problem, the second principal step is to bring together the 
various considerations involved, and respond to the issue posed in a way 
that gives collective expression to those elements and represents a just 
order as a whole. 
Finding the best collective expression that can be given to the values 
requires study of their interrelationship within the problem: Do they 
share common ground? Do they conflict? Are they reconcilable? 
Depending on the nature of their interrelationship, distinct methods are 
needed in order to compose them into a harmonious whole. Several such 
methods of composition exist, each suited to differing scenarios. 
Examples of these methods may include consensus, proximity, 
reconciliation, accommodation, balancing, and compromise. Resolving 
the overall legal problem entails, in most cases, the use of multiple 
methods, each dealing with separate aspects or steps of the composition 
as a whole.  
In order to most clearly explain and illustrate the operation of these 
various methods, it is convenient to examine them one at a time. 
(i) Methods of Composition 
(A) CONSENSUS 
One key method of composing elements is by consensus. Consensus 
here means finding common ground among multiple legal positions. 
Consensus needn’t be complete, encompassing comprehensive accord. 
Partial consensus, comprising agreement within an area of overlap, can 
still be fruitful, and is more often possible. A prominent example 
leveraging the method of consensus is as applied to the views on a case 
of the justices of the McLachlin Supreme Court. It being a collegiate 
court, those views constitute nine institutionally legitimate considerations 
bearing on its resultant caselaw. For this and related reasons, when 
Beverley McLachlin became Chief Justice, she identified consensus on 
the bench as a top priority.117 She reinforced that “consensus doesn’t 
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mean we’re all going to agree on everything … But consensus is 
valuable, in the sense that our goal is to try to reduce to a minimum the 
number of things we differ on”.118 The success of her efforts is confirmed 
by her successor, Richard Wagner, who remarked at his inauguration as 
Chief Justice that “she moved us to see what united us rather than what 
divided us. The Court, and our law, are the better for it”.119 Another 
example, this one dealing with consensus among multiple legal doctrines 
not judicial views, was Lord Denning’s famed but ill-fated claim that 
duress, undue influence, and unconscionability in Contract were 
instances of an underlying principle of “inequality of bargaining power” — 
a view refuted by the House of Lords.120 
(B) PROXIMITY 
A related means of combining factors is through finding a proximity 
between them, referring here to: identifying a close relationship or a 
meaningful similarity between them. In some cases, this may involve 
refining and recasting considerations so as to render more apparent the 
ways in which they are proximate, thereby correspondingly de-
emphasizing their divergences. In other cases, it may involve seeking a 
nexus between them, that illuminates an important link or connection 
they share that, in turn, supports the conclusion that they dwell in a 
certain proximity. Proximity, like consensus, reduces conflict between 
considerations. Yet, it is distinct from consensus in that it does not find 
common ground but finds perhaps neighbouring land or similar ground. 
Hence, where full consensus is unattainable or undesirable, proximity 
may serve to shrink disparity between considerations by loosening the 
degree of coterminacy or conformity sought between them, rather than 
by lessening the extent of accord sought between them as partial 
consensus does. One example is whether there is a relationship between a 
plaintiff and defendant that would suggest that they were in proximity, 
justifying a duty of care under the tort of negligence.121 Another example, 
aimed at criminal punishments pursuing proximity in the form of 
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similarity, is the principle of “parity in sentencing” (harmonisation des 
peines), which provides that “a sentence should be similar to sentences 
imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar 
circumstances”.122 
(C) RECONCILIATION 
Another way to assemble facets is through reconciliation. As used 
here, reconciliation consists in seeking an interpretation of different legal 
considerations that avoids repugnancy between them, so that expression 
can be given to each. One important example, which reconciles multiple 
legal provisions, is the Golden Rule of interpretation, mentioned 
earlier.123 Another prominent application is to the reconciliation of the 
rights of Aboriginal peoples and the Crown.124 As a method, it presents 
difficulties; as the Chief Justice notes, “reconciliation requires openness 
of spirit, endurance and great patience. But I believe that it is worth the 
effort” in what it enables.125  
(D) ACCOMMODATION 
Composition of interests can also be accomplished through 
accommodation. By this term, I mean: realizing the collective expression 
of multiple values by giving effect to only certain aspects of each, 
mutually tailored so as to avoid clashes between them. Accommodation 
is related to reconciliation in that both seek to avert the “exclusion” of 
legitimate considerations.126 Whereas reconciliation tries to understand 
each of the factors in a way that prevents conflict in the first place, 
accommodation initially accepts the existence of conflict but then strives 
to eliminate it by adapting each consideration to a reality in which they must  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
122  Now codified as Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 718.2(b). See R. v. Lacasse, 
[2015] S.C.J. No. 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, 2015 SCC 64, at para. 56ff (S.C.C.). 
123  See note 90 and associated text. 
124  See e.g., R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 31 
(S.C.C.). Chief Justice McLachlin describes this reconciliation as an “overarching project”: 
“Canada’s Legal System 150: Democracy and the Judiciary”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-
csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Canada 150”]. 
125  Constitution, supra, note 12. 
126  Beverley McLachlin, “The Civilization of Difference”, Remarks, online: <https://www.scc-
csc.ca/> [hereinafter “Civilization”]. 
34 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
coexist without either’s entire individual expression. The Chief Justice 
describes accommodation as a “delicate task”127 that involves “working out” 
or “brokering” differences.128 Accommodation plays a central role in 
Disability Law, giving effect to equality for disabled persons.129 Another 
notable example of its use is in Aboriginal Law, where the Crown may have 
a duty to adapt affected policies to accommodate Aboriginal interests.130 
(E) COMPROMISE 
Another mode of orchestrating diverse elements is through compromise. 
Faced with unavoidably competing interests, compromise operates to 
negotiate a give-and-take among them that gives partial effect to each, but 
also denies partial effect to each. Though related to balancing, compromise 
as here employed is distinct in applying where a conflict-dynamic arises out 
of the circumstances, rather than being inherent to the relationship between 
the considerations. Further, compromise is not a weighing of considerations, 
but a balance of expectations, factoring in expediency, other pragmatic 
matters, and circumstantial contingencies. Compromise is central to the “Co-
operative” conception of Canadian federalism favoured by the McLachlin 
Court.131 Another use was achieving restraint in the issuance of concurring 
opinions in the McLachlin Court, which colleagues of McLachlin C.J.C. cite 
as resulting from her encouraging justices to “‘compromise’ or 
‘accommodate’ the views of others”, where appropriate.132 These examples 
point to how compromise may often be used in tandem with 
accommodation, as part of the set of methods required to resolve a legal 
issue. As the Chief Justice put it, “solutions to our problems” require 
“constant compromise and negotiation between conflicting ideas 
and groups”.133 
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(F) BALANCING 
Balancing, discussed earlier, is likewise a technique commonly used 
to deal with divergent values present within a legal problem. Like 
compromise, balancing serves to resolve unavoidable conflicts. It 
endeavours, through a relative weighing of the considerations, to balance 
them in some way. Two scenarios can be discerned. The first is where the 
conflict arises from a natural opposition between the considerations, so 
that giving more effect to one entails giving less to another. An example 
might be the regulatory interests of legal certainty versus flexibility. As 
the Chief Justice observes, “lawyers facing oppositions such as these use 
the metaphor of balancing … we add or take away until we reach the 
proper balance”.134 In this scenario, then, the aim is to find a balance 
point that gives partial effect to each (or by another legal metaphor, 
determining “where to draw the line”). 
In the second balancing scenario, the conflict arises, as in compromise, 
from the circumstances — however, those circumstances also include the 
conflict’s uptake into a legally prescribed balancing test. Such a test might 
be necessary where, because of some factual or legal imperative, neither 
the first balancing scenario nor compromise are possible or practical. One 
value must then be given effect at the expense of the other. In order  
to decide which one, the test weighs their relative importance to a  
just result. The weighing is context-specific, not in abstracto, so that 
different interests may prevail in different contexts. This, Chief Justice 
McLachlin reports, helps achieve the “balances necessary for a workable 
[body of] law acceptable to society as a whole”.135 A prime example  
of balancing of this kind is the proportionality test for limiting 
Charter rights.136 
(ii) The Logic in Choosing a Method 
The preceding discussion should render evident the fact that there is 
a logic to the different methods, which informs how they work and the 
scenarios they are suited to. Recourse to them at random will not 
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produce harmony (other than coincidentally). Rather, the harmonious 
resolution of legal problems envisages that each of these methods is 
necessary at certain times and in certain contexts. And thus, harmony as 
a process is knowing (whether by intuition, or more formalized 
reasoning, or some combination of these) which method to use in what 
scenario.  
Related to this point, and as an example of it, the order in which the 
different methods were presented above lay on a spectrum from no conflict 
between considerations (consensus) to unmediated conflict (the second 
form of balancing). One would expect that, generally speaking, modes of 
composition which better avoid clashes, where possible, will enable the 
fullest collective expression, yielding a more harmonious resolution. For 
example, in constitutional review, the Chief Justice proposes that: 
First, it seems to me, the judge must seek to interpret a suspect law in a 
way that reconciles it with the constitutional norm, written or unwritten. 
Usually, this will resolve the problem. But in rare cases, it may not. If an 
ordinary law is clearly in conflict with a fundamental constitutional 
norm, the judge may have no option but to refuse to apply it.137  
Notable in that regard: the concept I previously thought definitive — 
balance — is in fact the crudest way of pursuing the harmony that 
characterizes Chief Justice McLachlin’s resolution of legal problems. 
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that balancing is often necessary 
due to the structure of litigation, the form of many legal tests, and the 
myriad conflicts typical of life and law in modern society. 
(iii) Mixed Methods in Complex Problems 
Above all, what the complexity of contemporary legal problems signals 
is that in any given case, the process of composing considerations is likely 
to involve a mix of multiple methods, each targeted to deal with different 
parts of the polyphony of elements seeking expression. This includes parts 
dwelling at distinct levels: substantive, procedural, institutional, remedial, 
relational, etc. As Section II.2(b)(ii) may imply, harmony as a process is 
also knowing, in the specific circumstances of a given problem, which 
methods to use in what sequence in dealing with different parts of the 
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overall problem. A more extensive elaboration of patterns of use of 
different methods, alone and in mixes, may offer a fruitful topic for future 
study. However, as mentioned, the process is not reducible to an algorithm, 
for it requires a full array of judicial skills and human qualities of 
judgment and common sense. 
(c) Justification of How the Process Has Been Conducted 
A final aspect of the process of pursuing a harmonious resolution of a 
legal problem is justifying the conduct of that process. This is not a separate 
step, but woven into the prior steps of identifying and combining 
considerations, where it addresses the aforestated need for legitimation. In 
the initial step, it does so by calling for legitimate factors’ frank 
acknowledgment, even if they are not given effect in how the elements 
must be put together at the subsequent step. In that latter step, it does so by 
explaining why those legitimate interests could not be given effect in the 
resolution rendered, including clarifying what was distinct about that 
context versus others where they could find expression. Chief Justice 
McLachlin underlines this need “to explain to those Canadians who feel 
that their moral opinions have been left behind why they should nonetheless 
celebrate and feel invested in the [legal] morality upon which their 
communal co-existence is based”.138 As such, this justification is sometimes 
said to have a “therapeutic” effect on society, by mitigating conflict and 
fostering social harmony.139 By contrast, a style of justification that lapses 
into the one-sidedness of advocacy, by only validating considerations 
consistent with a judgment’s own resolution, is — regardless of the justness 
of that outcome — a fundamental failure of justice at multiple levels. 
III. THE COMPLEXITY OF JUSTICE: HARMONY AS COMPARED  
TO OTHER APPROACHES TO LEGAL PROBLEM-SOLVING 
1. Hearing More Voices Allows Pursuit of a Higher Order of 
Justice 
As noted in Section I.2.(b), seeking a resolution which achieves 
harmony among the factors properly involved is not the only way of 
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responding to a legal issue that is faithful to legal principles, 
extrapolating from them, despite their own insufficiency. How does 
harmony relate to some other regularized potential approaches? 
Various possibilities can be distinguished based on how they address 
the nature of the legal problem as involving multiple interrelated 
legitimate interests. 
(a) Singularity 
From that perspective, a singular approach, which hears and gives 
effect to only one consideration, while deaf to the others, presents 
generally the lowest chance of attaining justice. It does not seek 
expression of other legitimate interests, or account for them as part of the 
whole. Even where one consideration is overriding, such a technique 
fails to minimize collateral damage to the others, and thus to the whole of 
which they are part. Special interest advocacy groups, not unsurprisingly, 
often present problems this way, as if there is a single issue — free 
speech, for instance. The risk of this is to drown out other voices; turning 
legal problem-solving into a contest in which the loudest voice “wins”. 
Yet justice fails by the neglect of others. 
(b) Hierarchy 
Alternatively, a hierarchical approach, which recognizes multiple 
interests but relies on a categorical ranking of them, and so gives effect 
to higher ranking interests over lower, is also generally inapt to achieve 
justice. In practice, it does consciously what the singular approach does 
unconsciously. This deep-seated modus operandi remains common 
throughout the law, though out of favour in Canada under the McLachlin 
Court — the Chief Justice repelled by the “Manichean logic of either-
or”, of all-or-nothing, of extremes and absolutes.140 Her reflection is that 
“when we have made mistakes, it has been because we ... imposed black-
and-white solutions on complex situations”.141 
For the above two methodologies, the greatest concern is that, over 
the totality of cases, they can cause systemic amplification of some 
interests and silencing of others. 
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(c) Balance 
Used as a standalone approach, balancing (described earlier) is 
perhaps the most prevalent and familiar. In the “line-drawing” type of 
balancing, multiple interests can obtain partial expression in any given 
case. In the “seesaw” type of balancing, one value is granted expression 
at the expense of another. However, unlike the hierarchical approach, this 
is not based on a categorical determination, but a case-by-case weighing, 
factoring in context. Over the totality of cases, this allows different 
considerations to gain expression, and on the whole for some account to 
be taken of each. Hence, balancing is significantly better able to pursue 
justice. Yet, on its own, it too sees the task as one of resolving conflict — 
thus overlooking ways of diminishing conflict that could allow for 
greater expression of appropriate considerations, and justice in the whole 
that is composed of them. In this, balancing echoes the adversarialism of 
the adjudicative process, where the sides demand opposing outcomes, 
and the court must decide between them.142 
The existence of the hierarchical and balancing techniques shows that, 
as Chief Justice McLachlin concludes, “the problem is not in combining 
[different] attributes in a single legal system, but in our thinking about 
how we combine them. We need a new way of thinking about how we 
combine them. We need a new way of looking at tension”.143 
(d) Harmony 
Compared with these other approaches, harmony represents a more 
nuanced, versatile, and sophisticated framework for legal problem-
solving. It strives to recognize as many different interests as are actually 
at stake in a legal problem, rather than to reduce a complex reality to the 
limited dimension(s) of preconceived legal devices designed primarily 
for the simpler task of deciding disputes. “How can we better manage 
difference?” asks the Chief Justice rhetorically: by a “response of 
respect, inclusion, and accommodation”.144 On that last point, harmony 
engages with the interrelationship between considerations as something 
                                                                                                                       
142  Given that adjudicants have sought dispute-resolution according to law, the legal problem 
underlying their dispute must be tended to. Doing so by striving for harmony could conceivably 
influence litigation, tempering the well-chronicled excesses of adversarialism that have come to 
afflict it. 
143  NZ, supra, note 11, at 35. 
144  Civilization, supra, note 126. 
40 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
dynamic — not only reflecting the context, but capable of adapting in 
meaning or application to what a just resolution on the whole requires. 
Harmony also perceives proximities, not just disparities. Yet, where 
conflict among values cannot be avoided, or for other reasons should not, 
harmony as noted encompasses tools of compromise and/or balance apt 
to resolve such clashes. It has all the associated ways, suited to different 
scenarios, of orchestrating the collective expression of different 
elements, rather than limiting that expression because of passing every 
such interrelationship through the thin filter of conflict.  
Thus, among these various approaches to legal problem-solving that, 
despite legal rules’ insufficiency, remain faithful to legal principles rather 
than defecting to idiosyncrasy or ideology, the one which gives best 
expression to those principles as an integral system which aspires to a 
just order is harmony. It cannot promise results, but does provide to those 
charged with pursuing it the right orientation, and equips them with 
wide-ranging and deep-extending guidance. 
2. Understanding Poor Adjudication as Disharmony 
Again putting aside decisions that are bad because of being tainted by 
idiosyncrasy or ideology, it follows from what has been said here that poor 
adjudication can be understood as leaving a state of disharmony. While the 
merit of particular resolutions of particular disputes will often be debated, 
there are certain types of decisions that are widely seen as failures. If 
pursuing harmony might be an optimal tack for legal problem-solving, it 
should be possible to rethink why these decisions are bad by pegging how 
they fall short in the pursuit of harmony. Some examples are outlined below. 
(a) “Splitting the Baby” 
One type of decision commonly seen as bad is “splitting the baby”, or 
hedging. Viewed from the standpoint of striving for harmony as the way 
to resolve legal problems, splitting the baby fails because it relies on 
compromise where compromise is inappropriate. The parties could have 
compromised, but came to court. Adjudication’s role in the system is 
decision, and at that stage, the parties may be viewed as having more of a 
stake in that process than in the substance of their dispute, given each 
side’s inherent risk of losing. Striving for harmony requires respect for 
the logic of the overall system and the distinct role of adjudication within 
(2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d) JUSTICE AS HARMONY 41 
it. This, and the associated aspect of the parties’ interests, are fundamental 
institutional and procedural interests among the ensemble of considerations 
legitimately at stake. From veterans of the Bar, one of the compliments 
of Chief Justice McLachlin I have heard often is that “she never splits the 
baby”. 
(b) The Path of Least Resistance 
Another type of bad decision is taking the path of “least resistance”, 
or that is least opposed to popular expectations. Through the lens of 
harmony as the way to resolve legal problems, this path can be seen to 
lead astray, by misidentifying which factors are legitimately invoked by 
the problem. I earlier quoted Chief Justice McLachlin on how judges 
must be sensitive to society’s values.145 It is essential to appreciate that, 
except where the following are proper evidence, this does not mean 
majority public opinion, or the opinion of powerful segments of society 
or of vocal groups, on moral questions that have become subjects of legal 
dispute. Rather, it means deeper, more basic, and consensus values: what 
she calls the “fundamental values upon which the society is premised — 
the shared commitments and values that constitute the deeper community 
constitutional morality”.146 Were it otherwise, “members of minority and 
disadvantaged groups”, for instance, might not be protected, which the 
Chief Justice has noted is important to the social harmony of “the larger 
polity”, and consistent with courts’ role as the non-political branch  
of government in the separation of powers — key institutional 
considerations at stake in court decisions.147 She did not herself shrink 
from conclusions sometimes unpopular, including, for instance, striking 
down a government monopoly of health insurance,148 or even curbing the 
scope of prohibited possession of child pornography.149 
(c) Legal Error 
The types of decisions reversed on appeal for errors of law, whether 
by using the wrong legal test, or misinterpreting or misapplying it, are 
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also explicable by the harmony framework for legal problem resolution. 
The insufficiency of legal rules is not total; there are countless 
reasonably settled principles — structures, rules about rules, doctrines, 
etc. that define in part how different interests relate to one another in 
various contexts, and prescribe how certain kinds of legal issues are to be 
resolved. Harmony works complementarily with these settled parts of the 
law, it does not displace them with unbridled discretion based on all of 
the factors. Indeed, without the settled parts, there would be nothing to 
guide the factors’ identification. Harmony does not exist in a vacuum. It 
extrapolates from existing elements to perform its limited role of guiding 
the problem-solving made necessary when the “right” answers are not 
already clear. I quibble “right” because sometimes a court may conclude 
that a clear precedent is wrong, and in appropriate cases, may develop 
the law. In that case, the court in justifying the change by reference to the 
considerations involved and the system’s aim of a just order, explains 
why the new rule produces greater harmony than the old.  
(d) Utopian Decisions 
Given the law’s societal functions, decisions that are unduly 
complicated or impracticable are also bad. From the perspective of 
harmony as a guide to legal problem-solving, the failure in this case can be 
crudely summarized as “quantity over quality” with respect to the 
considerations. Harmony does not dictate giving effect, at all costs, to the 
maximum number of values possible. Indeed, important regulatory 
considerations associated with legality like clarity, intelligibility, and 
consistency highlight the magnitude of practicability as a quality required 
of a resolution that achieves harmony in real terms. Chief Justice 
McLachlin has often commented on the need for practical sense;150 and 
certainly it is a dimension of problem-solving in which she excelled.151 
(e) Reductionist Decisions 
The opposite type of decision, which reduces the complexity of a 
problem to fit an oversimplified legal frame is also bad. Harmony, as a  
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philosophy for resolving legal problems, would recognize this as the 
result of short-changing the tasks of identifying and/or of composing the 
various factors involved. Section III.1 (“Hearing More Voices Allows 
Pursuit of a Higher Order of Justice”) cited approaches that provide 
common examples of how this can happen. 
IV. SOME DIMENSIONS OF APPLICATION OF HARMONY  
IN RESOLVING LEGAL PROBLEMS 
I now turn to surveying some of the types of considerations to which 
may be applied this framework for legal problem-solving: of addressing 
the issue at hand in such a way as to achieve harmony among the set of 
legitimate considerations involved. This will serve two purposes. First, 
the range of specific illustrations will serve to actively demonstrate the 
breadth of the framework’s capacity of application. Second, as part of 
that, the defined contexts in which its application will be surveyed may 
help better concretize various aspects of its operation. 
A full picture of the approach, encompassing its application to all the 
dimensions that concurrently arise in any given legal problem, would 
require something akin to an annotated “intellectual biography” of the 
resolution of a case. This information being confidential, unless the 
Supreme Court and the relevant members were willing to oblige, that 
simply may not be possible.152 Nonetheless, recalling the co-existence in 
a single problem of several of these “polycentric” dimensions of 
potential application, the reader may be better equipped by the survey 
which follows to imagine an approximation of a significant part of that 
picture.153  
Within the categories of considerations included below as illustrations 
of the framework’s capacity of application, many examples can be found 
in the career of Beverley McLachlin and the work of the McLachlin 
Court. The succeeding sections offer glimpses of six different dimensions 
of the challenges the Chief Justice faced, whether in adjudication, in 
nurturing the legal system, in civic leadership, or combinations thereof. 
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1. Sources 
A dimension of many legal problems, which the harmony-seeking 
approach to resolving legal problems can be applied to, is what to do 
about an ensemble of disparate sources legitimately bearing on the 
problem’s resolution. 
Such an application is called for by the Law of Evidence in determining 
the adjudicative facts of a case. The trial judge must decide which relevant 
sources of evidence to exclude as in some sense illegitimate. Of the 
evidence admitted, the trier of fact must then synthesize from among 
portions that corroborate, complement, or contradict one another, in order 
to form conclusions on the essential facts. 
The scenario which this article started with as a potential archetype — 
interpretation — determines the meaning of provisions also by drawing 
harmoniously on different sources (text, context, scheme, intent). The 
same is true of construction of statutory purpose.154 Even unwritten 
constitutional principles, Chief Justice McLachlin recalls from the 
Secession Reference155 having emerged by a similar exercise: “how can 
unwritten constitution principles be identified? The answer is that they 
can be identified from a nation’s past custom and usage; from the written 
text, if any, of the nation’s fundamental principles; and from the nation’s 
international commitments”,156 which again must be considered together, 
harmoniously. 
A significant function of appellate courts is to produce harmony at the 
level of the system, from diverse sources. For example, from scattered 
decisions of different courts at lower levels, they must organize a body of 
law, credible to those inside and outside of the system as comprising a 
just order. They must update the law as social realities change. To be 
particularly appreciated, given the relatively few cases appellate courts 
decide in comparison with the countless decisions made by lower courts, 
administrative decision-makers, and even private lawyers advising 
clients based on appellate courts’ guidance, is the effort Chief Justice 
McLachlin devoted to maintaining the harmony achieved by an appellate 
judgment beyond the instant of its release, by transmitting to front-line 
legal decision-makers the means to preserve, and indeed further enhance, 
that harmony. One way she did this was through what one encounters as 
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also a mainstay of her renown among law students — what they often call 
“multi-part tests” — which are only sometimes tests, but are always an 
unmistakable rendering of the ratio decidendi, along with clear guidance 
of how to apply it, and the highlighting of factors to be considered by 
lower courts in adapting it and extending it to foreseeable future cases. 
Bazley v. Curry,157 discussed in Sections IV.4-5 below, well illustrates this. 
A final example of the approach’s application to sources is in striving 
for harmony among the law’s institutional sources. This includes, by the 
logic of the separation of powers, the legislature and the judiciary: while 
legislation tends to be carved by the political winds prevailing at any 
given time, jurisprudence can “support long-term values that may be 
compromised or difficult to support given the need of elected members to 
secure re-election and popular approval”.158 Our system of governance 
through law is therefore “a complex, polycentric enterprise”,159 and for it 
“to function well, each branch of government must respect the peculiar 
role of the other”.160 Another institutional diversity of sources to be brought 
into harmony lies in the distinction between judicial and administrative law. 
“That results in a multi-layered dialogue”, the Chief Justice explains: “From 
their different vantage points, the institutional actors … play their 
parts”.161 Like other skilful judges, Chief Justice McLachlin was also adept 
at integrating important legal sources lying outside branches of 
government, including the academy, law reform commissions, and other 
authorities. Meanwhile, she excelled in her appreciation of the social 
facts in which the law is embedded and inextricable — in her phrase, 
“this complex mix of rules, practices and values that we call the law”.162 
2. Legal Orders 
Certain legal problems implicate distinct legal orders. This is another 
dimension which the legal problem-solving strategy of striving for 
harmony may be applied to.  
One example of this application has been to enhance harmony in the 
relationship between federal and provincial jurisdiction. The principle of 
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“co-operative federalism” gained favour in the McLachlin Court as a 
way to “facilitate interlocking federal and provincial legislative 
schemes”.163 With flexibility tempering the rigidity and crudeness of the 
doctrines of paramountcy and interjurisdictional immunity, it is thus 
possible to “avoid blocking the application of measures … enacted in 
furtherance of the public interest”.164  
Harmony also characterizes attending to the relationship between 
domestic and international law. As McLachlin C.J.C. summarized in a 
recent case: “legislation is presumed to comply with Canada’s international 
obligations, and courts should avoid interpretations that would violate 
those obligations. Courts must also interpret legislation in a way that 
reflects the values and principles of customary and conventional 
international law”.165 Under her tenure, the Court has also made important 
use of Comparative Law, achieving a certain level of harmony with foreign 
law dealing with parallel issues.166 
As far as orders corresponding to different legal traditions, discussed 
already have been the examples of the Harmonization Acts between 
federal common law and Quebec civil law,167 as well as efforts to 
reconcile European and Aboriginal-American legal traditions, still very 
much a work-in-progress due to the challenge, as the Chief Justice notes, 
that “Indigenous ideas about justice may differ radically from the 
adversarial and punishment-focused approaches we see in our courts”.168 
In former times, court justice and administrative justice were seen as 
on different planes; however, these too have taken strides in the 
McLachlin Court — sometimes spurred by the Chief Justice — towards 
a more harmonious relationship.169 As she confirms: “the choice is not 
between either the rule of law or administrative discretion, and the issue 
is not the extent to which the ‘law’ represented by the courts, should curb  
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administrative discretion … the real question: how can we achieve 
optimum decision-making in terms of quality and efficiency in both the 
legal and administrative fields?”170 
A harmonious relationship has also been sought between the supreme 
law of the Constitution and the ordinary law subject to it by virtue of 
constitutional review. Given that failure in this carries risks of charges of 
judicial activism on one hand, or abdication of constitutional duty on the 
other, this has not been an easy task. As Chief Justice McLachlin reflects, 
“it was delicate work. It required judges to balance interests and calibrate 
outcomes in a way that was both respectful of the role of elected 
legislators and administrators on the one hand, and true to the country’s 
constitutional guarantees on the other”.171 Prior to her retirement, she 
even projected: 
The most fundamental challenge for the judiciary in the years to come — 
one without which all other efforts will fail — is to maintain the proper 
constitutional balance between the judiciary on the one hand and the 
legislative and executive branches of governance on the other. This is a 
task in which all branches of governance must engage. Each branch 
must understand its role and respect the roles of the other.172 
3. Perspectives 
Every case involves a diverse set of legitimate perspectives on the 
resolution of the problem it presents. The harmony-seeking framework 
also applies to this dimension of a case. 
To begin with are the perspectives of the case actors contemplated by 
the system. In an appellate court, this includes the bench. Even before a 
panel is struck, the approach may be operative. For example, McLachlin 
C.J.C. was noted for preferring to have all nine judges sit on cases where 
possible.173 The process from then on, far from being intelligible as 
comprising individual judicial decisions and “voting”, is rather a 
complex matter of striving to compose judges’ different perspectives. 
Puisne justices confirm that, on the McLachlin Court, judicial case 
conferences were “comprehensive” in scope, with a high “level of 
deliberation”.174 Deliberation as a “professional responsibility requires 
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them to lay out both their own position and the defects they see in their 
colleagues’ positions … with respect and civility”,175 so that their 
“collective knowledge” can generate better judgments.176 Her successor as 
chief justice, Richard Wagner, summarized, “we, on this bench, help each 
other do better, and help this institution do better”.177  
As McLachlin C.J.C. explains, the process does not end there: 
Writing reasons is a continuation of the process of deliberation. The 
justice writing wrestles with the legal and sometimes factual problems 
the case presents, and when the first draft is sent out, other justices 
offer comments, criticisms and suggestions for improvement. The 
product that finally emerges after innumerable redrafts often looks 
quite different than what we envisioned around the conference table.178 
The product that emerges will not always be consensus. Justices of 
the McLachlin Court report that there was “widespread agreement with 
the view” of the aim being a “blend of individuality and collegiality”; as 
one put it, “I try to remind myself that we are not just soloists, but 
instead are members of a choir”.179 
Judicial conclusions are informed, in turn, by the perspectives brought 
by the parties and by the evidence they adduce based on their perspectives. 
The views of others involved in the case play a part as well. As Chief 
Justice McLachlin describes: 
We read the judgments below. We look at critical pieces of evidence. 
We study the written briefs of the parties and interveners. Usually, we 
ask one of our law clerks for a memo outlining all the arguments and 
possible dispositions. When we walk into the courtroom for the 
hearing, we know all about the case. Our minds, however, are open. We 
need to listen to the parties and interveners and ask them the questions 
that are troubling us.180 
Beyond the case actors that the system recognizes, society comprises 
individuals and groups with different outlooks (political, philosophical, 
religious, etc.) — representing another consideration that may need to be 
taken into account in meeting the challenge of legitimation and in 
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respecting multiculturalism.181 The Chief Justice explains that “a multiplicity 
of worldviews grounded in alternative sources of authority does not 
necessarily threaten the rule of law, but rather strengthens and completes 
public life and discourse”.182 In order for each view to be heard by the 
legal system without overwhelming it, the judge must be their mediator. 
As Chief Justice McLachlin says, “the judge must become the one who 
understands every voice”,183 and must be able to compose and conduct 
them towards the overall goal of a just order. This, she observes, 
“provides a way to reconcile the moral opinions of divergent groups, 
within the context of the fundamental constitutional morality upon which 
the society as a whole rests”.184  
But it is not all about difference. She explains that “while we may 
find no consensus on values and conceptions of the good in the narrow 
sense, the reality is that we hold much in common as human beings. 
Searching for this commonality brings us to share deeper values, basic 
principles which should govern our interaction”.185 Through this search, 
“case by case, we define and reinforce the common space that unites 
us”,186 with room to recognize our “shared humanity” and “shared 
values”.187 
4. Case-Specific Interests 
The legal problem at the heart of a case embraces multiple legitimate 
interests. These may include individual, group, and societal interests 
where implicated by a case. Resolving these issues by striving for 
harmony among legitimate considerations is an approach that certainly 
applies to this dimension of a problem. Given the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s comprehensive jurisdiction, and the span of the Chief Justice’s 
engagement with it, examples could be offered in almost any area. A few 
suffice by way of illustration. 
A first example comes from the Law of Evidence. R. v. Khan 
concerned a doctor’s alleged sexual assault of a young child unfit to 
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testify, whose telling of the incident to her mother was excluded as 
hearsay.188 Justice McLachlin (as she then was) framed the legal problem 
thus: “The question then is the extent to which, if at all, the strictures of 
the hearsay rule should be relaxed in the case of children’s testimony”.189 
Besides fair trial rights, she identified as other factors the frequency of 
such offences, the risk of obstructing their prosecution, and forcing 
children to relive trauma in giving evidence.190 The rigidity of the rule 
and its exceptions being insufficient to address these, McLachlin J. found 
harmony among them through “two general requirements: necessity and 
reliability”, reflecting “the principle and the policy underlying the 
hearsay rule”.191 This resolution has formed a cornerstone in the 
development of the Canadian Law of Evidence.192 
A second example, drawn from Tort Law, concerns when employers 
should be vicariously liable for intentional torts committed by their 
employees. In Bazley, McLachlin J. found the existing rule — the second 
arm of the Salmond Test, which asks whether the tort was an “unauthorized 
mode of performing an authorized act” — to be indeterminate, comprising 
“artificial or semantic distinctions”.193 She identified as appropriate 
considerations: effective compensation for victims, deterrence of 
future harm, and fairness in holding employers responsible.194 Harmony 
among these interests was achieved through the principle of enterprise 
risk: in this case providing that “employers may justly be held liable 
where the act falls within the ambit of the risk that the employer’s 
enterprise [materially] creates or exacerbates”.195 The harmony achieved 
by this resolution has since resonated in common law courts around  
the world.196 
National Security Law provides a third example. Chief Justice 
McLachlin rejects the reductionism of framing the relationship between  
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the values as strictly a conflict between rights and security.197 She quotes 
President of the Supreme Court of Israel Aharon Barak that “individual 
liberties constitute an important component of … security”, of what a 
country governed by the Rule of Law seeks to secure.198 At the same time, 
without security, there can be no rights. Different values, she notes, may 
therefore have an “intercourse” that confounds the assumption of 
discreteness upon which the balancing approach rests.199 Thus, in Charkaoui 
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),200 she struck down parts of the 
government’s security certificate regime, which violated basic legal rights 
guaranteed by the Charter; for instance, secret government evidence 
impeded rights to know and answer the case against one.201 But to avoid 
leaving security unprotected, she sought harmony by temporarily suspending 
the declaration of invalidity, while noting that measures such as special 
advocates to review secret evidence on behalf of detainees might comply 
with the Charter.202 Federal legislation was amended accordingly, and when 
subsequently challenged, was found to be constitutionally valid.203 
A fourth example pertains to proportionality as the framework for 
assessing whether rights limitations are justified under section 1 of the 
Charter.204 Proportionality centres around a balancing test — actually two 
balancing tests, as the Chief Justice clarified in Hutterian Brethren.205 Yet, 
what is interesting is how McLachlin C.J.C. sees the conflict inherent in 
that exercise as again dwelling within a larger harmony. Evoking the “co-
operative approach” to federalism, she uses the word “interlocking” to 
describe the “rights and responsibilities of the individual and the state” 
balanced through proportionality.206 Indeed, they are inseparable: “For all 
the celebrated individualism of recent decades, human beings are social 
beings. ‘A person only becomes a person through other people,’ proclaims 
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the African aphorism”.207 She judges, in fact, that “Canada’s history 
demonstrates a commitment to a positive partnership between the state and 
the individual, between the private interest and the public good … . 
Historically, we have tended to view rights, not as threatened by, but as 
existing in harmony with collective rights”.208 This distinctive 
“Cooperative Charter” theory is reflected in her jurisprudence, evident for 
example in cases like: Khawaja, where she upheld legislation implicating 
several freedoms but tailored to accommodate them;209 Nur, where she 
struck down legislation that made no such effort;210 and Hutterian 
Brethren, where she rejected a claim in which government attempts at 
accommodation were declined by the claimants who required a resolution 
that went beyond allowing reasonable government options.211 
Her broader interpretation of the Charter reprises a similar theme, 
evoking harmony: 
In my view, the uniquely Canadian character of the Charter is reflected 
in its emphasis on three kinds of rights: individual rights, tied to a 
conception of tolerance and respect; collective interests, bound up with 
an appreciation of the relationship of support and obligation between 
individual and community; and group rights, tied to a recognition that 
pluralism is one of Canada’s animating values.  
The Charter reconciles these three types of rights, not as contending 
forces balanced precariously against each other in basic opposition, but 
as complementary rights, drawing strength and support from each other. 
This, I think, is the Charter’s defining characteristic. And, to the extent 
this is so, it resonates with Canadians’ conception of themselves.212 
5. General Regulatory Interests 
Besides the interests specific to a given case, almost every legal problem 
involves interests associated with the law’s general societal function, which 
also may be orchestrated to achieve a harmonious resolution. These include 
considerations of legality (consistency, predictability, intelligibility, etc.) and 
of good governance (effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, adaptability, etc.). 
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Here, the aforementioned “tests” for which Chief Justice McLachlin 
is beloved among law students are a remarkable manifestation of the 
philosophy of seeking harmony. They tend to embody “principles-based 
regulation” — that is, high-level standards that guide rather than displace 
the judgment of front-line decision-makers.213 This form of regulation 
has been validated in many contexts for its capacity to deliver on 
multiple good governance objectives.214 Simultaneously, applied in this 
context by Chief Justice McLachlin, it achieves harmony among 
important interests of legality.  
The tests’ multiple parts are an incarnation of the compound and 
complex way in which the Chief Justice deploys principles-based 
regulatory techniques: Often, a primary “rule” directly embodies an 
overarching policy consideration, which is then complemented by a finite 
enumerated list of secondary factors. The secondary factors tend to either: 
(a) concretize the application of the abstract primary principle in various 
factual contexts (thus serving as presumptive quasi-rules); or (b) incorporate 
secondary but important policy considerations; or (c) encapsulate fact-based 
or principle-based exceptions to the general rule. 
In terms of interests of legality, casting governing rationes in this way 
can self-evidently be seen to allow substantial predictability and flexibility. 
Moreover, it integrates adaptability and stability, by anticipating concrete 
fact-driven incremental elaboration and evolution of the law, and infusing 
it within a guiding conceptual rational-universalism. Bazley, discussed 
earlier, illustrates this. Besides the primary principle already detailed,215 
McLachlin J. added: 
(3)  In determining the sufficiency of the connection between the 
employer’s creation or enhancement of the risk and the wrong 
complained of, subsidiary factors may be considered. These may 
vary with the nature of the case. When related to intentional torts, 
the relevant factors may include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
(a)  the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to 
abuse his or her power; 
(b)  the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the 
employer’s aims (and hence be more likely to have been 
committed by the employee); 
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(c)  the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, 
confrontation or intimacy inherent in the employer’s 
enterprise; 
(d)  the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to 
the victim; 
(e)  the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of 
the employee’s power.216 
Beyond the terms of the test itself, her typical non-exhaustive style of 
articulation preserves a residue of judicial discretion to accommodate the 
emergence of unanticipated new policy concerns. Meanwhile, on the 
other hand, McLachlin J. states that the test applies “where precedent is 
inconclusive”, thus encouraging legal certainty and consistency of 
adjudication as precedent accumulates.217  
In these ways, the “McLachlin multi-part tests” may also, from a 
Comparative Law perspective, be hypothesized as pursuing harmony in 
the two main influences on Canadian common law — viz., by combining 
the characteristic strengths, and avoiding the characteristic weaknesses, 
of the contrasting stereotypes of English legal formalism and American 
open-ended policy reasoning.218 Chief Justice McLachlin resisted 
extremes of either. For instance, R. v. Jordan’s numeric rendition of the 
right to be tried in a reasonable time is a crude example in Canada of the 
rigid-rule tack. In that case, the Chief Justice joined Cromwell J.’s sharp 
rebuke of the majority approach as “wrong in principle and unwise in 
practice”.219 Conversely, in R. v. Labaye, the Chief Justice rejected as 
excessively subjective the Supreme Court of Canada’s prior reliance on 
“community standards of tolerance” to decide criminal indecency.220 
6. In Leadership in Law 
Cases and other legal problems are decided within an institutional, 
professional, civic, and international context by which they are 
influenced and which they reciprocally influence. Harmony as a 
philosophy of legal problem-solving is also applicable to the dimension 
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consisting of this broader context. Far more than in any previous era, 
during the tenure of Beverley McLachlin the role of Chief Justice of 
Canada carried with it an enormous array of leadership duties, both 
substantive and symbolic.221 Across the several contexts cited, her 
leadership characteristically exemplified successful application of a 
harmonious approach. 
The most immediate context is her institutional leadership of the 
Supreme Court. Based on interviews with her fellow justices, Macfarlane 
adjudges that “there is no doubt that the whole environment of decision-
making is influenced at an important level on the Court by the chief 
justice”.222 This is so through a blend of practical matters, such as the 
Chief Justice assigning judgment writing responsibilities, and 
metaphysical matters, such as the cultivation of organizational culture. 
Of the latter, Macfarlane finds that the McLachlin Court “is driven by 
norms of consensus and collegiality. These norms so infuse the process 
of decision-making at the Court that in any given year, a majority of the 
cases are resolved on a unanimous basis”.223 He adds that the ideological 
model of judicial decision-making, which commonly explains the 
behaviour of other courts, “cannot account for the high degree of 
collegiality” on the McLachlin Court.224  
In order to function harmoniously as intended by its collegiate design, 
an appellate court requires collegiality among the members.225 Chief 
Justice McLachlin made a “concerted effort to foster collegiality”,226 and 
Chief Justice Wagner has since credited her “strong leadership” as a 
reason for the collegiality for which the Supreme Court of Canada has 
become known.227 Justice Louis LeBel, the longest-serving member of 
the McLachlin Court, concluded that she was “quite successful in 
preventing what happened in other courts — the court splitting into 
different groups and clans”.228 Some of the ways she accomplished this 
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were deceivingly simple, such as having a single small table in the 
judges’ dining room, so that they would share lunch together. If she was 
proactive in preventing conflict on the bench, she was equally aggressive 
in diffusing it.229 Her intolerance of disharmony was sufficiently 
respected that, on a rare occasion where sharp words were exchanged in 
competing draft judgments during her absence on other official business, 
those phrases suddenly vanished just as the Chief Justice’s plane touched 
down on her return to Ottawa. 
Appellate courts’ collegiate constitution, as well as vocation of 
rendering the law clear and coherent, also makes consensus another 
measure of institutional harmony. McCormick remarks that Chief Justice 
McLachlin attached “real importance to a more unified court”.230 This 
was buttressed by her belief that “nothing meaningful could happen 
without consensus from everyone involved”.231 Certainly, consensus’ 
strength creates solidity which enhances sustainability. Hence, colleagues 
described, “she may … find ways of reconciling divergent views”.232 
That, and other methods described in Section II.2, “sometimes led to 
consensus that didn’t exist initially”, as Donald Songer found; consensus 
was not “the state of nature”, but a quality “gradually emerging” from the 
institutional processes of the McLachlin Court.233 
Regarding writing assignments, Chief Justice McLachlin eschewed a 
singular approach based on seniority, and again sought to harmoniously 
combine several considerations (preferences, workload, regional 
representation, expertise, etc.) in a way that would best serve the Court 
docket as a whole. 
In the professional and civic contexts too, the Chief Justice exhibited 
harmony in tending to legal problem-solving. As reflected in the oft-
repeated remark that she took less time to rise to the Supreme Court than 
most cases heard by the Court,234 the legal system’s overwhelming  
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problems of access to justice call for bold action. Recognizing that all 
stakeholders would need to act in concert for meaningful change to 
occur, her vision was to “bring together a collaborative, wide-ranging, 
and nationally diverse group that represents as many aspects of and 
voices in the civil and family justice system as possible”.235 Another 
problem in the legal profession, and with a particularly adverse impact 
on women with child care responsibilities, is its culture of workaholism.236 
The Chief Justice, having the most onerous array of responsibilities 
(adjudicative, executive, public and foreign representative, etc.) in the 
profession, but also autonomy over how to execute them, led by 
example, practising what she preached: “you have to train yourself to get 
away for periods of time, whether it’s a weekend at a cottage, a day in 
the garden, or a few hours … being outdoors and taking long walks”.237 
This was not a question of balance, of sacrifices, as commonly framed; 
again, in Chief Justice McLachlin’s view, the work sphere as well as the 
other spheres (family, personal, culture, nature, etc.) mutually benefit 
from a harmonious relationship among them. 
In the international context, Chief Justice McLachlin saw clearly how 
the harmony of Canadian law, mirrored in Canada’s harmonious relations 
in a globalized world, made it attractive to other countries, creating the 
opportunity of leadership in their seeking to strengthen their own legal 
systems: “Canada has no colonial past, and global strategic plan, and is 
not a threat to anyone. For this reason, it can be a model. And in my 
experience, when Canadians speak of the institutions that foster 
tolerance, inclusion, and respect for human rights, many around the 
world are willing to listen. We must continue to speak, and we must 
continue to be heard”.238 Although past the age of retirement from the 
Supreme Court of Canada, she will continue this leadership part-time in 
the Far East, where harmony is already a force.239 
                                                                                                                       
235  Trevor Farrow, “A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform in Canada” in Alice Woolley, 
ed., In Search of the Ethical Lawyer (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), at 170. 
236  Beverley McLachlin, “The Legal Profession in the 21st Century,” CBA, online: 
<http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/NationalMagazine/media/MediaLibrary/pdf/2015-08-mclachlin.pdf>, 4. 
237  Alexander Herman, et al., Kickstart: How Successful Canadians Got Started (Toronto: 
Dundurn, 2008), at 125 [hereinafter “Kickstart”]. 
238  Globalization, supra, note 161. 
239  ZI-Ann Lum, “Beverley McLachlin Appointed To Hong Kong’s Highest Court” 
Huffington Post (21 March 2018), online: <https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/>. 
58 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2018) 87 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
V. HARMONY’S POTENTIAL GROUNDS OF APPEAL  
TO BEVERLEY MCLACHLIN 
In making the case in this article that Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
resolution of legal problems was characterized by addressing issues in a 
way that pursued harmony among the legitimate considerations involved, 
the question naturally arises of what might have led her to such an 
approach? 
Ultimately, she is the best judge of the experiences and thinking 
behind the philosophies that she employed. To date, her discussions of 
the task have used the term harmony less commonly than related but 
better-known terms such as balance, weaving a fabric, etc., which, being 
conventional, arouse less curiosity. Nonetheless, even a cursory glance at 
well-known aspects of her experience allow us to hazard a few possible 
hypotheses. 
For starters, I would suggest that it may be no coincidence that the 
approach seeking harmony is perfected by a Canadian. Mirroring the 
country’s international reputation, the Chief Justice has been described as 
“measured” and a calming influence.240 With a historically small 
population, Canada has been shaped by the confluent influences of its 
Indigenous roots, its English and French political parentage, and its 
global superpower neighbour. To survive and mature as a nation, it has 
had to achieve not merely balance, but a harmony among this set of 
sources and forces. Canada’s legal culture is no exception. Add to that 
the federal nature of the Constitution, plus the bijuralism of the nation’s 
European legal heritage, and the complexity of the challenge is clear. The 
Chief Justice summarizes: “in short, Canada is one of the most 
complicated, diverse countries” in the Western world.241 From that 
perspective, it is perhaps no surprise that this mode of resolution was 
conducted with so much sophistication by Beverley McLachlin. 
It seems to me likely also no coincidence to see this philosophy 
blossom by the efforts of a woman. Feminist literature suggests that 
“men and women approach moral and ethical dilemmas from different 
vantage points”.242 Women are firstly said to place greater emphasis on 
respect and empathy — correspondent with the initial stage of the 
harmony-seeking process, namely, acknowledgment of the legitimate 
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interests involved. Second, women are described as being “much more 
interested in trying to strengthen social relationships ... grounded in the 
assumption that self and others are interdependent”.243 This echoes the 
latter stage of the harmony-seeking process, wherein the various 
constituents are orchestrated with a view to the relationships among them 
and to the whole composed of them. Cynthia Ostberg and Matthew 
Wetstein conclude that Chief Justice McLachlin’s approach “parallels 
nicely with the themes articulated in feminist literature — that women 
seek to foster meaningful relationships between individuals and 
[between] groups, and are more interested than men in promoting 
community bonds and commitments to others”.244 While claims of that 
kind are inevitably generalizations, and to that extent oversimplifications, 
the broad pattern is sufficient at least for feminism to reasonably lay some 
claim to womanhood as a factor in the Chief Justice’s proficiency at 
these tasks. Moreover, beyond interpersonal and intergroup relationships, 
the same harmony-seeking feature in her work extends as between the 
various interests that affect people, as discussed in Part IV. 
More particular aspects of Beverley McLachlin’s background may 
also be factors. She was raised in a small town where family was a key 
institution and the community in some ways an extended family.245 The 
highly religious environment was a strong influence on her moral and 
ethical formation.246 As discussed in Part I.1, family and religion are 
normative spheres in which harmony has a high profile. Harmony would 
also constitute a recurring ideal within her pre-law formation in 
Philosophy, extending (in the West) from Plato’s Ethics to Kant’s 
Aesthetics.247 Of course, harmony also governs music — noted as being 
for Chief Justice McLachlin a lifelong passion248 — “music has always 
been part of my life”: growing up, her family had a band that played the 
country fairs, while other relatives sang opera or religious hymns, and 
she herself was in the school choir.249 Harmony must also have played a 
role in how she remarkably found a way to preserve an integral sense of 
self in young adulthood — a “farm girl” suddenly living in the big city,  
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working as a journalist, studying philosophy and law, with mostly men 
for peers in those years, then later raising a child while seamlessly 
navigating a varied and fast-rising career in the legal profession.250 
EPILOGUE 
Conclusion 
Striving to resolve legal problems in a way that gives the legitimate 
considerations involved harmonious collective expression is one of the 
hallmarks of Chief Justice McLachlin’s resoundingly successful career. 
Her genius at achieving this took shape in countless examples in her 
roles as judge, jurist, and civic leader. Each of these provides an 
invaluable model for others charged in the future with similar functions 
to look to in tackling their own responsibilities. Greater consciousness of 
what was characteristic of her vision of the judicious resolution of legal 
problems, and a clearer conceptual account of the aim as well as the 
process, may help those interested in pursuing this. To try to assist in that 
has been this article’s aspiration. 
Final Thoughts 
Might there be wider significance to this distinctive feature of Chief 
Justice McLachlin’s approach, in meeting the challenges emergent in our 
society now and into the future? Part I.1 observed that harmony’s 
centrality to aspirations of just order in cultures across the world and 
over history was shared by the Western world’s “official” legal systems, 
yet sharply attenuated in practice by their exclusion of a distinct role for 
harmony, recognized by and operating within the system as a guiding 
concept in working out the proper relationship among other elements and 
the whole, as part of resolving the rules’ insufficiencies. Yet, harmony 
was noted to fulfil this customary role in Western “unofficial legal 
systems”, family and religion.251 Throughout Western history, it is the 
latter that have been the dominant cultural forces. It is only in recent 
decades — the era roughly contemporaneous with Beverley McLachlin’s 
adulthood — that this changed, with the societal breakdown of the family 
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and religious exodus in the West. Since then, the official legal system’s 
scope of engagement has expanded, together with expectations that it do 
more than decide disputes among persons or between persons and the 
state; there has been a belief that it can and should strive, in the most 
general sense, for justice in social terms and at a community level — 
formerly preoccupations of family and religion.252 In that new reality 
where Western official law became responsible for pursuing the just 
order no longer in such a limited sense but in a much more 
comprehensive sense, the indissociable imperative of harmony had to 
survive as a distinct guiding principle this same transmigration. 
And yet, at the time of the present writing, the West is witness to 
unprecedented social disintegration, a civil “culture war” over relative 
preferences among legitimate policy considerations,253 and historic 
lows of public trust in organizations and institutions with consequent 
suffering in society as a whole.254 While these phenomena have many 
causes, the common responsibility for their solution belongs to the 
law, whose duty the preservation of harmony had become.255 Thus, 
phenomena like these powerfully evince the overwhelming failure of 
the law to do so.  
In an age where ideas know no borders, Canada is not immune to 
such trends. But thus far, the country has tried harder to resist them than 
many places. I submit that this is thanks in part to Chief Justice 
McLachlin and the McLachlin Court’s concern for harmony in Canadian 
law, and the stewardship that orientation has provided to Canadian 
society. If this is so, her insight and skill may indeed be of wider 
significance in navigating the future of Western society.  
The Chief Justice proclaims: “Nothing is more important than justice 
and the just society. It is essential to the flourishing of men, women and 
children and to maintaining social stability and security”.256 The question 
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is how do we achieve that? Outside the Supreme Court of Canada, stands 
Lady Justice, who relies on scales of balance, a depiction of our legal 
tradition’s past. For a generation, inside the Supreme Court of Canada, 
sat Lady Chief Justice McLachlin, pursuing harmony, a model for our 
legal tradition’s future. 
 
